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INTRODUCTION 
Students studying business planning in an American law school 
should be told up front that a twenty-first century transactional lawyer 
rarely encounters a truly simple business transaction.  Legal 
educators acknowledge the need to emphasize the complex, 
multidisciplinary nature of advising modern business clients.1  Law 
students must be introduced to the reality that transactional attorneys 
routinely collaborate with accountants, engineers, and other types of 
specialists and consultants to properly identify issues and address 
 
 1 See generally Mary C. Daly, What the MDP Debate Can Teach Us About Law Practice 
in the New Millennium and the Need for Curricular Reform, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 521 (2000); 
Phoebe A. Haddon, The MDP Controversy: What Legal Educators Should Know, 50 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 504 (2000); Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and 
Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241 (1997); Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and 
Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 249 (2004); Dina Schlossberg, An Examination of Transactional Law Clinics and 
Interdisciplinary Education, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195 (2003); see also Mary C. Daly, 
Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers 
in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 284-85 (2000) 
[hereinafter Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely]; Susan Poser, Main Street Multidisciplinary 
Practice Firms: Laboratories for the Future, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 95, 117-21 (2003). 
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their clients’ needs.  Businesses—particularly firms comprised of 
entrepreneurs on tight budgets in terms of both time and money—
benefit greatly when relevant information is accurately and efficiently 
communicated to the requisite team of advisors, and primary 
responsibility for each pertinent issue is assigned to the most 
qualified team member.  The value of services delivered to business 
clients is further enhanced if all team members have a meaningful 
understanding of at least the basic elements of the issues being 
handled, as well as the vocabulary and problem-solving techniques 
employed by each trade or profession involved. 
A uniquely effective approach to providing high quality service 
might take the form of an interdisciplinary business planning firm, 
owned and controlled by a group of knowledgeable parties that are 
willing to share risks and rewards, abide by ethical rules designed to 
protect the public, learn from each other, and deliver coordinated 
advice to firm clients.  Law students—educated on both the 
importance of collaborative efforts among service providers and the 
long-recognized advantages of pooling resources and sharing profits 
in a business organization—might, therefore, be surprised to learn 
that the formation of such a “fully integrated, multidisciplinary 
partnership”2 (“MDP”) violates rules governing the conduct of 
attorneys in virtually every state.3  The existing rules require service 
 
 2 For purposes of this Article, “fully integrated” refers to a firm that is owned by 
lawyers and nonlawyers, controlled by lawyers, nonlawyers, or both, offering legal 
and other services, and presumably marketing itself as the provider of an effectively 
coordinated web of services.  For descriptions of the “Fully Integrated” model, along 
with descriptions of the four “less integrated models” of multidisciplinary practice 
(known as the “Cooperative,” “Command and Control,” “Ancillary Business,” and 
“Contract” models), in which either the variety of services and/or the extent to 
which nonlawyers can possess ownership or control rights are severely limited, see 
generally Marc N. Biamonte, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a Change in Model Rule 
5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (2001); Daly, Choosing 
Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 224-27; Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or 
Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in 
the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of 
Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 589 (2002) [hereinafter Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, 
or Entrepreneur?]; John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and 
the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services 
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 153-71 (2000); COMM’N ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, HYPOTHETICALS AND MODELS (1999), at 
http://www.abanet.org /cpr/multicomhypos.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); STATE 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT AND FINDINGS 
ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE iv-v, 21-23 (June 29, 2001), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2001_MDP-Report.pdf [hereinafter 
CAL. MDP RPT.]. 
 3 As discussed infra in notes 160-69 and accompanying text, the principal 
impediment to fully integrated MDPs is the version of Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model 
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providers to pursue more cumbersome (and less entrepreneurial) 
mechanisms for the delivery of interdisciplinary services.4  These rules 
also encourage lawyers in nonlegal professional services firms to 
claim that they are not providing legal services in order to avoid what 
has been called the “regulatory tent” under which lawyers ordinarily 
practice.5 
 
Rules of Professional Conduct that is in place in most United States jurisdictions.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1990) [hereinafter MRPC 5.4]; see also 
COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, BACKGROUND PAPER ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 8 n.41 (Jan. 1999), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreport0199.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 BACKGROUND PAPER] (explaining that while the 
District of Columbia has a special version of MRPC 5.4 that allows lawyers to practice 
in an MDP owned by lawyers and nonlawyers in that jurisdiction if the MDP’s 
purpose is confined to the delivery of “legal services,” and although some states have 
generally declined to adopt a version of the ABA’s Model Rules, prohibitions 
corresponding to the key aspects of MRPC 5.4 precluding fully integrated MDPs “are 
found in the ethics codes of the fifty states”). 
The current version of MRPC 5.4, as it relates to the MDP debate and reflecting 
the 1990 and 2002 amendments, is essentially the same as the original rule that was 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983.  See infra note 162; see also CAL. MDP 
RPT., supra note 2, at vi, 3 (referring to the fully integrated model as the “pure form” 
of MDP and noting that such form of MDP is “universally prohibited”). 
 4 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 167 (noting that solo and small 
firm lawyers may find it “too complicated or cumbersome to contract with other 
professionals” and that a fully integrated model provides a more sensible sharing of 
economic risks and rewards); George Steven Swan, A Multidisciplinary Bar and 
Financial Planners: The Recommendation of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 369, 374 (2003) (observing that the rules 
banning fee-sharing with non-lawyers “renders multidisciplinary practice more costly 
and inefficient”); COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, APP. C: 
REPORTER’S NOTES (1999), at 
 http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 REPORTER’S NOTES] (citing testimony of the 
ABA General Practice Council, Solo and Small Firm Section regarding “the need for 
multidisciplinary counseling of individual and business clients and the inefficiencies 
in attempting to satisfy that need through the coordinated advice of professionals in 
nonaffiliated firms”); CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 1 (explaining the reasons for 
the formation of the California MDP Task Force by observing that limitations on 
lawyers fee-sharing and acting as “co-principals” with nonlawyers “may have become 
hindrances in delivering effective legal services to the consuming public”).  Cf.  
Burnele V. Powell, Back to the Future Along the Hudson: Is the New York State of Mind 
Confused About MDPs?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1377, 1398 [hereinafter Powell, Back to the 
Future] (suggesting that the MDP issue might be properly framed as a question of 
how the legal profession can “release the pent-up entrepreneurial talents of 
lawyers—especially, the traditional small and solo practitioners and young lawyers 
who have been educated in, and in many instances have become used to working in, 
team-oriented environments”). 
 5 See COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, UPDATED 
BACKGROUND AND INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 8, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) [hereinafter 
ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND REPORT]; ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 
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Proposals to remove existing obstacles to the formation and 
maintenance of fully integrated MDPs have been the subject of 
heated debate in the legal profession and legal academia for 
approximately the last six years.6  Attention to the MDP issues has 
been fueled to some extent by developments in other countries that 
have accepted at least some forms of multidisciplinary practice, or are 
studying proposals to do so.7  Approximately four years ago the 
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) House of Delegates summarily 
rejected the recommendations of the ABA’s Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP Commission”), which would have 
facilitated the formation and regulation of at least some forms of fully 
integrated MDPs in the United States.  Despite the ABA’s adoption of 
“Resolution 10F” in July 2000,8 many states have continued to 
consider modification of their rules to permit these firms.  Thus far 
 
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 8 (both sources referring to an effort to prevent 
attorneys in non-traditional practice settings from attempting to avoid the attorney 
conduct “regulatory tent” by claiming that they are not practicing law). 
 6 See, e.g., Janice A. Alwin & Jason P. Eckerly, Raising the Tax Bar: Redefining the 
Roles of Accountants and Lawyers for a Practical Solution to the Multidisciplinary Practice 
Debate, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 257, 259-60 (2003) (chronicling the debate since 
1998); Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 589-92; Robert R. 
Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible Ignorance: MDP, MJP and 
Ancillary Business After Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 733-51 (2002). 
But note that similar issues had been debated before.  See, e.g., Daly, Choosing 
Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 241-43; James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting 
at the Root of Core Values: A ‘Radical’ Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to 
Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1192-96 (both sources 
recounting the history of MRPC 5.4, and describing the ABA’s 1983 rejection of the 
proposal by the Kutak Commission that would have legitimized “all forms of law 
practice and all financial arrangements for providing legal service, so long as there 
were assurances that the participating lawyers would meet their responsibilities under 
the rules of professional conduct”). 
 7 See generally COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SUMMARY 
OF FOREIGN MDP ACTIVITY, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-summ_fore_act.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2004); Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat or Entrepreneur, supra note 2; 
Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547 (2000); Laurel 
S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule Become A New Rule, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 
869, 883-91 (1999) [hereinafter Terry, A Primer on MDPs]; Charles W. Wolfram, 
Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law: Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 961 (2002) [hereinafter Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice]. 
 8 See HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 10F, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecom10f.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter RESOLUTION 10F].  Approximately three-fourths of the Delegates that 
voted cast their votes in favor of Resolution 10F.  See John Gibeaut, It’s a Done Deal: 
House of Delegate Crushes MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92, 92 (2000); L. Harold Levinson, 
Collaboration Between Lawyers and Others: Coping with the ABA Model Rules After Resolution 
10F, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 133 (2001).  The work of the MDP Commission in 
the approximately two years leading up to the adoption of Resolution 10F is 
discussed infra notes 170-223 and accompanying text. 
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none have implemented such modifications.9  Over the last few years, 
the ABA, the courts, and the bar associations of many states have also 
been revisiting existing definitions of the “practice of law,” as those 
definitions are used in rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of 
law (“UPL”).10  At the same time, UPL issues have been involved in 
 
 9 In February 2000, the MDP Commission reported that approximately forty-one 
state and local bar associations were studying the possible relaxation of prohibitions 
on fee sharing in a multidisciplinary practice context.  See COMM’N ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, POSTSCRIPT TO FEBRUARY 2000 MIDYEAR 
MEETING 1 (2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/postscript.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2004) [hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 POSTSCRIPT].  The ABA Web site 
contains status reports, in both chart and narrative form, that cover MDP studies and 
initiatives of various states and demonstrate that many states continued MDP studies 
after the ABA House of Delegates took action in July 2000.  See COMM’N ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATUS OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 
BY STATE (AND SOME LOCAL BARS)-UPDATED CHART, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state_action.html (last modified Apr. 2, 2003); 
COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATUS OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE BY STATE (AND SOME LOCAL BARS)-UPDATED NARRATIVE, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp_state_summ.html (last modified Apr. 2, 2003) 
[hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N STATES STATUS RPT.].  As of the fall of 2003, only a 
few of these studies had yielded pro-MDP recommendations, though many were 
deferred or put on hold.  See Poser, supra note 1, at 107-08 & nn.64-70.  Subsequent 
responses to status inquiries directed to representatives of state bar associations and 
court committees indicate that as of the date this Article was submitted for 
publication, most state bar association and court committee activity related to the 
MDP issue had been suspended because of the onset of other important issues.  
Memorandum from Andrew Koszewski, to Professor Anthony Luppino (Apr. 28, 
2004), as updated by Memorandum from Theresa Fette-Warner, to Anthony 
Luppino (October 16, 2004) [hereinafter Koszewski Memo] (on file with author).  In 
2002, New York did adopt a very limited set of provisions permitting certain types of 
contract models and “strategic alliance” MDPs, but it clearly continued banning fully 
integrated MDPs.  See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.  Perhaps the most 
ambitious of the existing state MDP projects, in terms of the possibility that it will 
result in at least a “pilot” or “demonstration” project for a fully integrated MDP, is 
the proposal reflected in the California MDP Report. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 10 See TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, DRAFT DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model_def_definition.html (Sept. 18, 2002) 
[hereinafter ABA MODEL DEFINITION]; TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, APP. A: STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_statutes.pdf (last visited Oct. 
23, 2004).  The ABA Task Force’s failed attempt to formulate a “model definition” is 
discussed in Part III, infra.  Responses to status inquiries regarding state-by-state 
initiatives indicate that the most productive active state practice of law projects have 
been in Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming.  Koszewski 
Memo, supra note 9.  See also KAN. BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE (May 23, 2004) [hereinafter KAN. UPL COMM. RPT.] (on 
file with author) (urging Board of Governors of Kansas Bar Association to 
recommend the Committee’s proposed practice of law definition to the Kansas 
Supreme Court); MASS. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO DEFINE THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS (June 2, 2004), at 
http://www.massbar.org/article.php?c_id=6622 [hereinafter MASS. UPL TASK FORCE 
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several areas, including studies of possible reform of rules governing 
multi-jurisdictional practice (“MJP”) by lawyers licensed in one or 
more jurisdictions who seek to work on matters in jurisdictions in 
which they are not licensed; law firms’ provision of “ancillary,” that is 
nonlegal services; and the regulation of “legal software” or “e-
commerce.”11  One commonly expressed goal of these projects is to 
provide more affordable, readily accessible professional services to 
underserved segments of the public.12 
This Article will focus primarily on one such constituency—
entrepreneurs endeavoring to start, sustain, or grow businesses.  
Representing a large segment of the United States economy, 
entrepreneurs, especially those involved in “small firm” businesses,13 
 
RPT.] (requesting comments on a proposed practice of law definition). Significant 
state practice of law definition projects are discussed infra notes 108-19 and 151-57 
and accompanying text. 
 11 See COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N,  CLIENT 
REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/jclr_home.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
(including MJP-related recommendations adopted by the ABA’s House of Delegates 
on August 12, 2002); AM. BAR ASS’N, JOINT COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REGULATION, STATE 
MJP AND ETHICS 2000 CONTACTS, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/state_contact_list.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2004); 
Keatinge, supra note 6, at 752-70; Justin D. Leonard, Cyberlawyering and the Small 
Business: Software Makes Hard Law (But Good Sense), 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 323 
(2003); Mark Nance, E-Commerce and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 ELEC. BANKING 
L. & COM. REP. 11 (June 2003). 
 12 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 
CASE W.  RES. L. REV. 531, 574-78 (1994) (discussing the interplay of restrictions on 
practice with nonlawyers and the needs of “ordinary” American consumers several 
years prior to the most recent MDP, but after the Kutak Commission’s unsuccessful 
attempt at relaxation of such restrictions); Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and 
True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 762 (2001) (discussing studies documenting “a 
substantial need for legal services by both poor and moderate-income Americans”); 
CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 43 (characterizing the MDP debate as “a starting 
point in reconsidering the systems by which legal services are provided to a public .  .  
. the majority of which is now unserved or underserved by the legal profession”); see 
also Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Announces New Online 
Legal Research Center, available at 
http://www.abanews.org/releases/news041404.html (April 14, 2004) (announcing 
the establishment of an on-line resource center to provide assistance to groups 
studying “unbundling” arrangements under which, in an effort to make legal services 
more affordable, clients handle some aspects of their matter pro se and the lawyer 
delivers specified legal services on discrete tasks). 
 13 According to a 2002 report by the United States government’s Small Business 
Administration’s (“SBA”) Office of Advocacy, “small firms” (which the SBA defines as 
those with fewer than 500 employees) “represent about 99 percent of employers, 
employ about half the private sector workforce and are responsible for about two-
thirds to three-quarters of the net new jobs.”  OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR 2002, at 2, available at 
www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbei02.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).  The SBA also 
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have a distinct need for the coordinated delivery of legal counsel and 
other services.  Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that many 
entrepreneurs are failing to get adequate advice on legal matters.14  
At the same time, many others are customarily using an inordinate 
amount of their resources to pay the separate fees of lawyers and 
other professionals who are failing to achieve the communication 
and other efficiencies that might result if they were members of a 
single firm.15  This Article posits that fully integrated MDPs among 
lawyers, accountants and other nonlawyers (such as, for example, 
financial planners, engineers, business consultants, and insurance 
specialists), with a business planning and transaction implementation 
focus, would not only provide high quality, cost-effective services to 
their clients, but also help ensure that all of the service providers 
follow ethical rules designed to protect the public.  In support of that 
conclusion, the analysis herein expands on arguments derived from 
the rich body of literature surrounding the MDP Commission’s work 
and subsequent MDP debate, and draws on more recent lessons from 
ill-fated UPL initiatives as they relate to competence in the delivery of 
interdisciplinary services.  The discussion below also emphasizes 
 
reported that during 2002, the number of sole proprietorships in the United States 
rose to 18.4 million. Id. at 4; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 250-59 (discussing the 
importance, prominence, and underserved needs of small businesses in the context 
of community revitalization and economic and social justice). 
 14 See, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 7 (citing 
testimony and comments from consumer groups received by the MDP Commission 
suggesting that “more clients might actually use the services of a lawyer if that lawyer 
were practicing in a multidisciplinary professional services firm,” and that “many 
middle-income individuals with legal needs do not go to lawyers due to unfamiliarity, 
discontent or even fear”); CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 43 (observing that a 
majority of the public is “unserved or underserved by the legal profession”); 
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 126-27 (arguing that MDPs might be of 
benefit to small businesses, particularly in small towns where partnerships between 
lawyers and nonlawyers might be necessary to produce economically viable services); 
Poser, supra note 1, at 109-14 (pointing to “client demand” in various areas of need 
for legal advice to lower and moderate income individuals and small businesses). 
 15 See ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 6 (“The 
testimony before the Commission by consumer groups offered overwhelming 
support for the proposition that individual clients need integrated professional 
advice in any number of areas, including estate planning, small business counseling, 
accounting, and regulatory compliance.  In the consumer groups’ collective opinion, 
a dual practice model cannot meet these pressing needs.”); Daniel R. Fischel, 
Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 BUS. LAW. 951, 972 (2000) (positing that a firm of 
professionals from multiple disciplines may be more attractive to a client than 
contracting with such professionals separately and may thereby “offer clients a 
superior product at lower cost [than law firms]”); Haddon, supra note 1, at 516 
(citing anecdotal evidence of low-income consumer and small business demand for 
MDPs due to cost efficiencies and other benefits of a “team-centered” rather than 
“segmented” approach to problem-solving). 
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several practical aspects of transactional work and the sharing of risks 
and rewards in a business organization to demonstrate the feasibility 
of a regulatory structure under which participants in a fully 
integrated business planning MDP would have incentives to abide by 
appropriate standards of conduct in the delivery of services to their 
clients. 
To provide context for these propositions, Part I summarizes the 
principal policy arguments that have characterized the MDP debate, 
including a description of conflicting views as to the extent to which 
MDPs might erode “core values” of the legal profession.16  Part II 
describes a hypothetical business formation scenario, as an example 
of a common situation in which the services of a business planning 
firm owned and operated by qualified lawyers and nonlawyers might 
be tremendously valuable.  Part III then examines existing obstacles 
to the operation of such a firm, taking into account recent efforts to 
better define the “practice of law,” and addressing attorney conduct 
rules that continue to preclude the formation of fully integrated 
MDPs.  That examination reveals that in business planning and 
 
 16 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 15, at 974 (arguing that “rhetoric” of MDP 
opponents regarding such core values is merely a “cloak” for economic 
protectionism); Lawrence J. Fox, Dan’s World: A Free Enterprise Dream and Ethics 
Nightmare, 55 BUS. LAW. 1533, 1534 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Dan’s World] 
(responding to Fischel by advocating strenuous resistance to MDPs, citing “core 
values” of the legal profession and arguing that “what separates [lawyers] from a 
world of auditors, investment bankers, and insurance salesman is our commitment to 
a higher set of values . . . . “); Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking 
the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1375-76 (2000) (describing the “core values” 
rationale expressed by MDP opponents and observing that William G. Paul, then 
President of the ABA, “suggests that allowance of MDPs would impact ‘our treasured 
core values,’ including ‘[l]awyer independence, avoidance of conflicts of interest, 
zealous representation [of clients] and the attorney/client privilege’”); 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TASK FORCE, ALA. STATE BAR, PROPOSED REPORT TO THE 
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS OF THE “CON” SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ALABAMA STATE 
BAR’S MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TASK FORCE (June 2, 2000) (on file with author) 
(“The rule changes required to render the MDP concept legal would, in the opinion 
of this committee, require the abandonment of the core values of the legal 
profession in this state and deprive clients of the most valued and basic principles 
governing the practice of law.”); SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM 
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION—THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, available at http://www.lawcornell.edu/ethic/mdp.htm 
(Apr. 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter MACCRATE NY-MDP RPT.] 
(recommending rejection of proposals to allow fully integrated MDPs based on 
traditional core values and the proposition that maintaining a “unified profession” is 
itself a core value of the American Legal Profession); see also Daly, Monopolist, 
Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 624 (noting that “professional judgment, 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and protection of client communications” are “the 
nettlesome core issues of the MDP debate”). 
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transactional work, where the lines between “legal” and “nonlegal” 
work are often quite blurry, there are no compelling reasons to retain 
a system that grants to firms owned or controlled exclusively by 
lawyers a monopoly on the delivery of the arguably “legal” services 
involved.  Finally, Part IV suggests specific elements of a regulatory 
framework that are designed to permit fully integrated business 
planning MDPs to operate in a manner—adaptable to other types of 
multidisciplinary firms as well—that would elevate substance over 
form to both serve clients more efficiently and preserve core values of 
the legal profession that are in the public interest. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE MDP DEBATE 
Many proponents of MDPs have properly cited “one-stop 
shopping” as a key to effective communication, appropriate division 
of responsibility, and informed collaboration among the 
professionals involved in a challenging modern day business planning 
project.17  Other supporters of MDPs stress free market concepts, 
 
 17 See, e.g., Alwin & Eckerly, supra note 6, at 261 (“Lawyers cannot do it all, but 
neither can any other licensed professional.  A coordination of legal and nonlegal 
services into one practice minimizes the risk that a pertinent legal or business issue 
will be missed.”); Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision through Multidisciplinary 
Practice—Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 787, 789 (2002) (advocating the acceptance of multidisciplinary practice in 
providing a range of legal, medical, and social services to those in need and arguing 
that separating legal from other services is “a reflection of shortsighted planning or 
lack of will”); Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 282 (extolling the 
benefits of one-stop shopping both with respect to advising small business clients and 
advising individual clients on a wide range of “life-style decisions”); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 2, at 117 (“When individuals work together on a regular basis, they 
provide a synergy that is simply not present when an individual works alone.  The 
synergy is more likely to produce higher quality service for a client requiring both 
legal and non-legal representation.”); Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1210 
(“Given the significant challenges facing American lawyers in the twenty-first century, 
such as globalization, rapid technological change, universal access to specialized 
information, and growing consumer demands for efficiency and cost effectiveness, it 
seems likely that the use of MDP organizations will prove an increasingly effective 
approach (and perhaps the only efficient approach) for the delivery of at least some 
legal services.”); Corinne N. Lalli, Multidisciplinary Practices: The Ultimate Department 
Store for Professionals, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 283, 286 (2003) 
(characterizing “one-stop shopping” as a centerpiece of movements toward MDP); J. 
Michael Norwood & Alan Patterson, Problem-Solving in a Multi-Disciplinary 
Environment? Must Ethics Get in the Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 337, 341 
(2002) (observing, with respect to relationships among legal and other professionals, 
that “[i]f they are managed well, the client will benefit from access to a creative and 
holistic problem-solving approach that can only be designed and implemented by a 
team of multidisciplinary professionals.”); Poser, supra note 1, at 113 (“A common 
partnership fosters a shared culture and produces a consistently high work product 
with uniform attention to professional standards.”); Swan, supra note 4, at 375 (“high 
net-worth individuals desire one-stop shopping for services”). 
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arguing that the competition engendered by allowing such firms to 
compete with traditional law firms will ultimately benefit the public.18 
Still others take the position that MDPs will inevitably exist in some 
form in the United States, and that those who oversee the legal 
profession should acknowledge them and subject them to 
thoughtfully tailored regulation sooner rather than later.19  
Nonetheless, the rules restricting the practice of law and those that 
govern attorney conduct in the United States have historically 
prohibited the formation of fully integrated MDPs, primarily through 
bans on partnerships and profit-sharing between lawyers and 
nonlawyers.20 
Opponents of initiatives to modify the existing rules and 
legitimize MDPs have based their opposition principally on the risk of 
having legal services provided by presumably unqualified 
nonlawyers,21 and perceived threats to core values of the legal 
profession.  The most commonly cited “core values” allegedly in 
 
 18 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 15, at 972-73 (arguing that MDPs may offer lower-
cost interdisciplinary services than law firms and that self-serving protectionist 
arguments by lawyers to avoid or delay giving clients that option are “inimical to 
clients’ welfare and reverse indicators of desirable social policy”); Andrew M. 
Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1038-39 
(2003) (observing that advocates of the “dominant view” of professional regulation 
favor the ability of clients to choose their legal representation, and that “dominant 
view critics” ought to appreciate that multidisciplinary practice can result in greater 
access to and affordability of legal services). 
 19 See, e.g., John H. Matheson and Edward S. Adams, Not “If” but “How”: Reflecting 
on the ABA Commission’s Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1269, 1271, 1313 (2000); M. Courtland McBryde, The Future of Multidisciplinary 
Practices in North Carolina: Love’ Em or Hate ‘Em, North Carolina’s Only Option Is to 
Regulate Them, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 195, 215 (2001); Burnele V. Powell, 
Looking Ahead to the Alpha Jurisdiction: Some Considerations That the First MDP Jurisdiction 
Will Want to Think About, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 104 (2001) [hereinafter 
Powell, Looking Ahead]; Terry, A Primer on MDPs, supra note 7, at  922, 948. 
 20 See supra note 3. 
 21 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 144 (“Opponents of MDPs also 
contend that relaxing current restrictions will lead to a proliferation in the 
unauthorized practice of law, and will place lawyers who work in MDPs at risk of 
violating ethical rules by assisting nonlawyers engaged in such conduct.”); Carol A. 
Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual 
or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1338 (2000) (“Any 
effort to use MDPs as an opening wedge to explicitly permit persons with no legal 
training to practice law should not be permitted.”); Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary 
Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2000) (“Opponents of 
MDPs are concerned that if this development is permitted, we could soon have title 
companies openly practicing real estate law, banks practicing estate planning and 
probate law, and even large department stores having a legal department where legal 
services could be purchased” and “[s]ome have argued that the best way to deal with 
the MDP phenomenon is to more strictly enforce the unauthorized practice of law 
statutes.”). 
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jeopardy are the maintenance of the lawyer’s independent judgment, 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and preservation of the 
confidentiality of communications with clients.22  The invocation of 
unauthorized practice and core values concerns ultimately thwarted 
the efforts of the ABA MDP Commission in 1999 and 2000 to fashion 
reforms that, if adopted by the states, would have accommodated 
fully integrated MDPs within a regulated framework.23 
Several commentators have challenged such opposition, arguing 
that the predictions of harm to the public and subversion of the legal 
profession’s core values that might come about by permitting MDPs 
are nothing more than rhetoric and hyperbole.24  The fact that 
“competence” was not prominently mentioned in the litany of core 
values typically cited by MDP opponents did not deter other 
interested observers from recognizing its importance in the MDP 
debate,25 and further supported questioning of the selectivity of the 
core values targeted by those opposing MDPs.  Supplementing their 
usual arguments in response to such criticisms, MDP opponents have 
opportunistically cited recent, major audit failures involving publicly 
held companies as evidence of the dangers they see in allowing 
lawyers to fraternize too closely with accountants.26  Using initial 
 
 22 See supra note 16. 
 23 See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 12, at 747-49; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 
87, 128-52; see infra notes 170-218 and accompanying text. 
 24 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 15, at 974 (“Although defenders of the ban on fee 
sharing have attempted to cloak their arguments in the rhetoric of ‘professionalism,’ 
‘lawyer’s independent judgment,’ and the ‘public interest,’ their goals are no 
different from any other trade union or interest group pursuing economic 
protectionism.”); Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary 
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values 
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1145 (2000) (“[T]he core values rationale is a belated 
explanation for restrictions that, at their inception, were transparently motivated by 
the financial self-interest of the bar’s leadership . . . .  [O]nly recently have defenders 
united around the core values rationale, which remains a work-in-process.”); Powell, 
Looking Ahead, supra note 19, at 117 (citing the lack of empirical support for many of 
the “hyperbolic warnings” of MDP opponents and observing that “many of the 
predictions made by MDP opponents were, of course, the products of hyperbole, 
distortion, and the convenient lapses of memory that are so common to political 
discourse”). 
 25 See, e.g., Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1201-02 (discussing competence as 
core value and arguing that MDP arrangements can “preserve the individual lawyer’s 
ability to develop professionally while at the same time the client is protected from 
unqualified decision-making and advice by the lawyer acting outside his own field of 
expertise”); see also Terry, A Primer on MDPs, supra note 7, at 934; infra notes 203-04 
and accompanying text (discussing the MDP Commission’s failure in its initial 
Report and Recommendation to identify competence as a core value). 
 26 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black 
Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 549 (2002) [hereinafter Fox, MDPs Done Gone] 
(referring to the Enron experience as a “vindication” of lawyers who opposed what 
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reactions to the “Enron debacle” and similar corporate financial 
scandals in this manner reflects a superficial and ultimately flawed 
analysis.  As persuasively argued by Dean Burnele Powell,27 who served 
as a member of the ABA’s Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 
those who argue that these corporate crises support a distancing of 
lawyers from accountants on purported ethical grounds overlook the 
reality that plenty of lawyers were involved in those situations.28  These 
MDP opponents fail to recognize the distinct possibility that more 
interaction among the accountants and lawyers involved might have 
helped to avoid, rather than facilitate, scandalous transactions and 
deceptive accounting.29 
 
he characterizes as the Big Five accounting firms’ “arrogant business model of one-
stop shopping”); Seth Rosner, The Enron “What-If”—The Other Multidisciplinary Practice 
Story, 12 EXPERIENCE 22, 22 (Spring 2002) (citing Arthur Andersen’s involvement in 
the Enron collapse as evidence that MDP opponents were right and commending 
those who opposed the MDP proposal when it came to the ABA House of Delegates 
for saying, “Not in our profession”); see also Keatinge, supra note 6, at 718 & n.2 
(citing various reports of such claims of victory and observing that “[w]ith the demise 
of Enron Corporation, those who have opposed [multidisciplinary practice] have 
wasted no time in claiming that their opposition has been vindicated and that the 
last nail has been driven into the coffin of [multidisciplinary practice]”); Poser, supra 
note 1, at 98 (discussing the trend that many commentators see Arthur Andersen’s 
Enron problems as the “nail in the MDP coffin”); Order, In re Petition of the Minn. 
State Bar Ass’n to Amend the Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct to Authorize 
Multidisciplinary Practice, No. C8-84-1650 (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002) (reasoning, in the 
course of denying the Minnesota state bar’s request for rules amendments to permit 
MDPs, that “[d]evelopments in the arena of the accounting profession and corporate 
financial misconduct . . . counsel strongly against adoption of such a change in the 
structure of the legal profession at this time”). 
 27 Dean of the University of Missouri–Kansas City School of Law during his 
tenure on the ABA’s MDP Commission, and currently Dean of the University of 
South Carolina School of Law. 
 28 See Burnele V. Powell, The Lesson of Enron for the Future of MDPs: Out of the 
Shadows and Into the Sunlight, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291 (2002) [hereinafter Powell, The 
Lesson of Enron]; see also Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle 
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1237-43 (2003) (observing that many lawyers 
were undoubtedly involved in structuring and implementing the Enron transactions 
that are being scrutinized and referred to as accounting scandals). 
 29 See Powell, The Lesson of Enron, supra note 28, at 1299 (asserting that “the one 
thing that will become clear when the dust settles after Enron is that if the legal 
profession had put the multidisciplinary safeguards in place . . . when it had the 
opportunity to do so, Enron would probably not have happened”); see also NANCY B. 
RAPOPORT & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
xiii (2004) (“The financial engineers assumed that the lawyers were taking care of 
the ‘legal stuff,’ and the lawyers assumed the accountants were taking care of the 
‘financial stuff.’  Instead, legal and financial niceties were ignored, forgotten, or 
distorted.”); Richard W. Painter, Afterword: Jurisdictional Competition as Federalism’s 
Answer to the Multidisciplinary Practice Debate, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 188 (2001) 
(“Whether or not lawyers and accountants practice in the same firm, they need to 
understand each other’s professions and cooperate in order to maximize their value 
to corporate clients.”); Nancy B. Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In re Enron: 
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In many other respects, the MDP debate has been unduly 
influenced by exaggerated arguments, unwarranted predictions of 
doom, form over substance reasoning and, most importantly, 
insufficient attention to the needs of clients and obligations to the 
public at large.  Notable literature in opposition to MDPs suggests, 
for example, that condoning the formation of such firms would result 
in a handful of multinational accounting firms essentially putting 
American lawyers out of business.30  MDP opponents also strain to 
foster the belief that by practicing in firms together with accountants, 
lawyers will automatically lose their ability to comply with their ethical 
obligations and will recklessly facilitate the unauthorized practice of 
 
Should the Debate on MDP Change at All?, 65 TEX. B.J. 446, 446-447 (2002) [hereinafter 
Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In re Enron] (arguing that the MDP debate 
should continue post-Enron and that both lawyers and accountants should focus on 
determining what kind of advice they should be giving their clients); Susan B. 
Schwab, Bringing Down the Bar: Accountants Challenge the Meaning of Unauthorized 
Practice, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1425, 1442 (2000) (“Accountants must know the law to 
adapt their accounting practice to its requirements.  Similarly, lawyers must be 
familiar with accounting principles to properly advise their clients on various 
business issues.”). 
 30 See generally Fox, Dan’s World, supra note 16 (arguing that there are many 
dangers inherent in the then “Big Five” taking over ever-increasing segments of the 
practice of law in ways that would undermine “core values” of the legal profession); 
Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and 
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1100, 
1107 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Accountants] (asserting that the then “Big Five” had 
“mounted a frontal assault on the legal profession”—which Fox characterizes as 
“guerilla war”—and warning against what he perceives as threats to the legal 
profession’s “core values” as “the accounting profession, in the name of the Big Five, 
have continued to expand their legal services, hiring new lawyers, launching their 
own law firms . . . and establishing special relationships with existing firms”). 
Many commentators on the MDP controversy acknowledge the prominence of 
considerations regarding the “Big Five” in the debate.  See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 12, 
at 748 (observing that “the issue of MDP is usually associated with the ‘Big Five’ 
accounting firms seeking to expand the delivery of professional services to 
sophisticated clients”); Green, supra note 24, at 1115 n.6 (“The current debate about 
multidisciplinary practice was sparked by the work of the Big Five accounting firms 
which employ thousands of lawyers to assist in rendering services to their clients.”); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Foreword: The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2000) (“In contemplating the 
MDP issue, we naturally think first of the big accounting firms.”); Jones & Manning, 
supra note 6, at 1183 n.112 (stating that “the [MDP] issue was pushed to the 
forefront only as large accounting firms began to make significant inroads in 
providing services traditionally offered through law firms”); Ted Schneyer, 
Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in 
Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1476 (2000) (positing that “with the specter of 
the Big Five haunting the legalization [of MDPs] debate, any regulatory system must 
be designed with such entities in mind”); Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: 
Context, History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1635-36 (2000) (characterizing 
the focus on the activities of the Big Five as a “fixation”). 
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law by presumably unqualified and perhaps less scrupulous 
nonlawyers, quizzically implying that individual lawyers have the 
ability to maintain high ethical standards only if surrounded and 
influenced exclusively by other lawyers.31 
While the MDP debate continues to focus largely on alleged 
excesses of the now “Big Four” accounting firms,32 apparently under 
an assumption that lawyers are, as a group, inherently more virtuous 
than accountants or other professionals,33 many elements of the 
public—not just the relatively affluent clients who could afford the 
fees of “Big-Four” MDPs—suffer from the delay in permitting and 
regulating what many feel is the unavoidable emergence of MDPs in 
the United States.34  As some observers have begun to point out with 
more vigor in the last few years—in such diverse areas as family law, 
health and social services and small business and community 
development—many low and middle income consumers of legal and 
other professional services are likely beneficiaries of the efficiencies 
of multidisciplinary practice, and are consequently damaged by bars 
 
 31 See Fox, Dan’s World, supra note 16, at 1534 (declaring that “what separates us 
from the world of auditors, investment bankers, and insurance salesmen is our 
commitment to a higher set of values,” and that “placing lawyers in alterative practice 
settings in which they were mere employees or even partners of others would destroy 
the bulwark that has been our profession’s best defense against the compromise of 
these values”); Fox, Accountants, supra note 30, at 1103 (“It is pressure from 
nonclient, nonlawyers that we must be ever vigilant to guard against and it is 
precisely those influences that compromise our professional independence.”); 
Rosner, supra note 26, at 23 (reflecting on the Enron debacle and asserting that the 
legal profession owes much to lawyers and bar associations who kept MDPs out of  
“our profession,” but also suggesting that lawyers not be “smug about the MDP 
matter” and instead be diligent in telling clients when they are engaging in 
wrongdoing and when they should take corrective action).  Cf. Powell, Looking Ahead, 
supra note 19, at 114-15 (“The opponents to MDPs were, from the outset and remain, 
wedded to the principle that lawyers are inherently incapable of working in peer 
relationships with other professionals . . . .”). 
 32 See, e.g., Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 599-644 
(describing the ongoing prominent role of the accounting firms in MDP debates in 
various European countries, as well as the United States, and predicting that the 
demise of Arthur Andersen will not mean the end of MDP efforts by what she 
cleverly refers to as the “Final Four”—i.e., the four firms remaining of the “Big Five,” 
which formerly included Arthur Andersen); Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary 
Practice, supra note 7, at 963 (suggesting that “too often” MDP discussions “devolve 
into a discussion of the ambitions of the Big Five”). 
 33 Compare sources cited supra note 31, with Fischel, supra note 15, at 956 (“[T]he 
notion that lawyers are somehow more virtuous and public minded than others is an 
obviously self-serving characterization without empirical support.”), and Jones & 
Manning, supra note 6, at 1203 (“Indeed, to suggest that lawyers are more prone to 
honesty and fair dealing than other professionals or even more interested in the 
maintenance of an effective judicial system than other citizens smacks of professional 
hubris.”). 
 34 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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to the formation of MDPs.35  In keeping with the focus of this Article 
on business transactions, Part II below illustrates in detail how a fully 
integrated MDP might be of particular value to entrepreneurs of 
modest means planning the formation and operation of a business 
venture.36 
II.  A TYPICAL BUSINESS PLANNING CHALLENGE 
Among the many types of projects on which a business lawyer, 
along with other professionals and specialists, might customarily 
provide assistance to clients is the formation of a new business 
venture.  Imagine, for example, a situation in which an individual 
named Brad is planning the establishment of a sports/recreational 
facility (the “Transplex”), featuring what he believes will be a unique 
blend of interactive sports-oriented games and water-sports rides, 
along with a food court.  Brad is a mechanical engineer by training 
and is currently employed as the supervisor of the repair crew at a 
very large amusement park in a metropolitan area.  He is an 
extremely observant and creative individual.  He makes a decent 
salary, but has little savings and a substantial amount of outstanding 
student loans. 
Brad shows his friend Janet a sketch he made of the Transplex 
and shares with her his ideas as to an ideal location on some 
undeveloped land which he inherited from his parents.  The 
proposed site is about one hundred miles south of the amusement 
park where Brad works.  Janet teaches physical education at a local 
high school near the proposed site of the Transplex, and coaches 
some of the school’s sports teams.  She earns a very modest salary and 
does not have other substantial financial resources, apart from 
 
 35 See generally, e.g., Brustin, supra note 17; Crystal, supra note 12; Jones, supra note 
1; Norwood and Patterson, supra note 17; Poser, supra note 1. 
 36 For general references in the MDP literature to the possibility of MDPs 
benefiting small firms and small business, see, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 7 (reporting that the MDP Commission found 
particularly significant testimony of the Council of the ABA General Practice, Solo 
and Small Firm Section and noting “the need for multidisciplinary counseling of 
individual and business clients and the inefficiencies in attempting to satisfy that 
need through the coordinated advice of professionals in nonaffiliated firms”); Daly, 
Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 282 (“An MDP will allow the Main Street 
lawyer to offer the small business client “one-stop-shopping for advice in a wide range 
of areas, including dispute resolution, tax, technology, business planning, 
environmental regulation compliance, and human resources.”); Poser, supra note 1 
(citing both “client demand” and “lawyer demand” and proposing special system of 
regulation for fully integrated MDPs that would limit the number of “professional 
members” which might operate in a variety of practice areas, including advising small 
businesses, to thirty members). 
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$50,000 that she recently won in the state lottery.  Having concluded 
that Brad’s plans for the Transplex are well conceived, and that, in 
her opinion, it will likely do very well in the proposed location, Janet 
tells Brad that she might be interested in investing in the project.  
Neither Brad nor Janet has any meaningful experience with business 
organizations, marketing, or finance, and neither has ever hired a 
lawyer.  Brad is now seeking professional advice regarding the 
formation of a business venture to develop, own, and operate the 
Transplex. 
The circumstances surrounding Brad’s Transplex proposal are 
not unlike those present in many entrepreneurial endeavors.  
Someone with creativity, a willingness to take calculated risks and a 
confident sense of what consumers want has an idea, and has 
identified someone else with some “seed money” that might help 
transmute that idea into a profitable business.  As with many start-up 
business ventures, there is a multitude of issues to address in advising 
Brad, which will require many different types of expertise.  The 
remainder of this section will briefly discuss some of the principal 
business planning issues implicated in the Transplex scenario and 
identify a variety of service providers with whom Brad may want to 
consult. 
A. Principal Issues Presented 
1. Threshold Business Points 
Two broad categories of business issues confront Brad.  First, he 
will have to consider matters pertaining to the business enterprise in 
relation to third parties, such as consumers and competitors for the 
same consumer dollars.  Second, he will have to address the 
appropriate division of rights and responsibilities among parties 
involved in the ownership and operation of the enterprise, such as co-
owners and employees.  The first group of issues might include, for 
instance, budgeting questions, a feasibility study and marketing 
analysis, determination of the number and types of employees 
necessary to operate the facility, price-setting and payment 
mechanics, and advertising decisions.  The second category, relating 
to employees’ and co-owners’ rights and responsibilities, presumably 
would include such concerns as arranging employee compensation 
and benefits and, with respect to co-owners, agreement on such 
critical points as obligations to contribute capital or personally 
guarantee financing; sharing of profits and losses; decision-making 
processes and sharing of authority; transferability of ownership 
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interests; and buy–sell rights. 
2. Legal Issues in Implementing the Business Plan 
The Transplex hypothetical presents questions that will require 
input from several legal disciplines.  There will certainly be a need for 
a choice of entity analysis involving, among other things, intertwining 
of business organization laws and federal, state, and local tax laws.37  
The process of raising capital will bring federal and state securities 
laws into play.38  Employment law will also be critical in terms of such 
issues as analyzing whether Brad might be breaching any obligations 
to his current employer, negotiating and drafting employment 
agreements with Transplex employees,39 negotiating and drafting 
organizational documents among the owners of the new business 
venture, and entering into contracts with construction contractors 
and various suppliers of goods and services.  Then there is the need 
to identify and obtain all necessary licenses and permits.  The 
business will have to comply with zoning laws and environmental 
laws, as well as health and safety and other labor-related laws.40  There 
will be intellectual property issues to address.41  Succession and estate 
planning for the business and its owners should also be considered.42  
As planning goes forward on the Transplex project, additional legal 
issues may arise; the list described above is by no means exhaustive. 
3. Other Miscellaneous, But Important Matters 
In the course of planning the proposed Transplex venture, a 
wide range of ancillary matters will also become important.  For 
example, the nature of the business suggests a need for careful 
assessment of insurance requirements and securing of related 
 
 37 For general descriptions of principal tax and non-tax factors involved in a 
choice of entity analysis, see, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 56-113 
(3d ed. 2001); THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 18-23 (Standard ed. 2003); Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from 
Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 790-
805 (2004). 
 38 See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 37, at 573-696; Mann et al., supra note 37, at 829-
39. 
 39 See, e.g., Mann et al., supra note 37, at 806-17. 
 40 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 
at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) (alerting those 
interested in starting small business to comply with such laws and regulations). 
 41 See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 37, at 45-50; Mann et al., supra note 37, at 775-89. 
 42 See generally EDWIN T. HOOD ET AL., CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES IN ESTATE 
PLANNING (2d ed. 2003) (exploring the many tax and other legal issues involved in 
addressing relationship between business and succession planning for a closely held 
business and the estate planning goals of its owners). 
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insurance coverage.  In addition, the business will require payroll 
management and bookkeeping systems, ongoing tax reporting and 
payment arrangements, property maintenance and clean-up services, 
continuous marketing and advertising activities, and arrangements 
for the purchase and delivery of goods and services needed to 
operate the business.  Many other miscellaneous issues not 
mentioned above may also require attention as further details of the 
business plan are developed. 
B. Individuals Needed for Requisite Advising 
Unfortunately for small business entrepreneurs, the number and 
complexity of business, legal and ancillary issues involved in the 
formation and operation of business ventures is not proportionate to 
the amount of dollars involved in the particular enterprise.  The 
Transplex situation illustrates that even a relatively small business 
endeavor presents a number of issue-spotting and problem-resolution 
challenges.  As in the case of Brad and Janet, the principals or 
founders of the business may excel in technical areas and/or have 
funds to fuel the venture, but often may have little or no familiarity 
with the many detailed aspects of designing a sound business plan, 
negotiating contract terms, creating an organizational structure, and 
complying with a maze of tax and other laws in establishing and 
conducting the business.  It is not at all surprising that someone in 
Brad’s situation will be seeking professional assistance in such 
matters. 
How many advisors will Brad need to help him get the Transplex 
up and running?  He could certainly use at least one lawyer.  Indeed, 
the scope of legal issues described above suggests that he may need 
more than one, since some specialty areas of the law will certainly be 
involved.  The business will likely need to employ one or more 
accountants to handle on-site bookkeeping and the preparation of 
financial and tax reports, and perhaps to engage in tax planning.  
Given Brad and Janet’s lack of experience in operating their own 
business, they might also seek advice from business consultants 
familiar with budgeting, marketing, and finance.  An expert in 
computer systems and information technology may also be an 
important resource.  Other possibly important advisors might include 
individuals experienced in real estate development, insurance agents, 
systems analysts and advertising experts. 
In short, sound business planning for Brad’s project will almost 
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certainly require a team of qualified players.43  The team could 
comprise a network of individuals from different firms, attempting to 
coordinate their efforts on Brad’s behalf.  Opponents of fully 
integrated MDPs tend to argue that the “one firm” approach is 
unnecessary, and that some attention to communication among the 
individuals from the different law, accounting, and other firms 
involved can supply the necessary coordination.44  This line of 
reasoning is reflected in the work of Lawrence Fox, one of the most 
vocal and prominent MDP opponents, who asserts that the need for 
“one-stop shopping” is exaggerated and belittles the concept by 
referring to it as “making one telephone call instead of two.”45  Such 
an oversimplification is more than just hyperbole.  It is, among other 
things, a reflection of the fact that the MDP debate has been largely 
waged as a turf battle between lawyers and accountants.  The result 
has been insufficient attention to the practical challenges of 
obtaining multidisciplinary counseling often faced by clients of 
modest financial means and limited sophistication as consumers of 
professional services. 
In Brad’s situation, for example, the team of service providers—
likely to consist of more than just lawyers and accountants—would 
work most efficiently if it initially met together with Brad, allowing 
him to explain his project to all of them at once, face-to face.46  Such 
a meeting would have multiple benefits, in addition to the client’s 
convenience.  In terms of effective fact gathering and team building, 
a one-location, all-hands meeting is superior to the conference call or 
“e-meeting” alternatives because it allows for perception of demeanor 
and interactive questioning where the participants can visually as well 
 
 43 See, e.g., Schlossberg, supra note 1, at 195 (stressing the need to expose law 
students in clinical programs that involve transactional work to the importance of 
collaborative multidisciplinary team approaches); see also supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
 44 See Fox, Accountants, supra note 30, at 1104 (questioning the “so-called benefit” 
of one-stop shopping); Haddon, supra note 1, at 517 (“The opponents of change 
seemed to trivialize and even disparage clients’ concerns about cost and their desire 
for one-stop shopping, and they emphasized that significant contractual 
opportunities and other possibilities for collaboration exist without permitting fee 
sharing.”). 
 45 Fox, Accountants, supra note 30, at 1104. 
 46 Cf. Biamonte, supra note 2, at 1167-69 (summarizing efficiency and quality 
control benefits in coordinated settings discerned from testimony of small business 
and other witnesses before the MDP Commission); Brustin, supra note 17, at 788-96 
(extolling the virtues of a holistic multidisciplinary approach in community settings 
involving a blending of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and social workers); 
Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In re Enron, supra note 29, at 446-47 (arguing 
that clients want the opportunity to tell their story once, avoid having issues missed, 
and “get the best advice possible from a synergy of professional opinions”). 
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as verbally assess appropriate times to break and measure responses.  
Such personal interaction reduces the potential for 
miscommunication inherent in the alternative of separate meetings 
between Brad and the various service providers, or in a network 
approach where Brad explains the project to, say, a lawyer, who then, 
in separate telephone or other communications, explains it to the 
accountant, business consultant, insurance agent and other 
specialists.  Physically assembling individuals with issue-spotting skills 
from multiple disciplines, at least at early-stage planning sessions, can 
also help prevent the inefficiencies that result when one advisor starts 
the client down a path of planning only to later find that 
considerations from another discipline (often the law) preclude 
following that path. 
Some might argue that this type of meeting is overkill—that 
having several individuals together, many of whom may be charging 
on an hourly basis, is piling a lot of fees on the client, who may not 
necessarily need everyone there for an entire meeting.  Certainly, 
care must be taken to engage in a cost-benefit analysis in determining 
which individuals should be asked to participate in the session, and to 
set and follow an agenda (that might, for example, include dismissing 
certain team members from the session when their continued 
presence ceases to be cost effective).  Lawyers are exceptionally good 
at identifying the need for experts in other areas, and at setting and 
implementing an agenda for multidisciplinary cooperation.47  Many 
fees are not just a question of the hourly rates; they are generally 
determined by multiplying those rates by the number of hours to do 
the job.  If handled thoughtfully, multidisciplinary planning meetings 
ultimately save significant amounts of time and trouble, and thus 
tend to help keep fees manageable and avoid costly surprises. 
It does not, of course, follow that the virtues of the “all hands” 
meeting require that the service providers all be members of a single 
firm.  However, in many circumstances, a client would benefit if that 
were the case.  Among other things, having one firm rather than 
 
 47 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 294-303 (1984) (observing that the business lawyer can be a 
“transaction cost engineer”); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL 
L. REV. 99, 108 (citing Gilson, supra, with approval, and noting that “lawyers are 
among the first service providers that entrepreneurs contact to hone a strategy, 
establish ties with other key industry players, and prepare the start-up for 
introduction to investors”); MACCRATE NY-MDP RPT., supra note 16, ch. 4.1 (“When 
the need arises, lawyers are quite capable of working effectively with other 
professionals, and frequently recommend that particular accountants, financial 
advisors, investment bankers, engineers, brokers, social workers, and others be 
engaged by their clients.”). 
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many provide Brad with the necessary start-up services would tend to 
reduce “overhead” expenses substantially, particularly when one 
considers such matters as consolidating administrative support, 
billing and collection systems, personnel, and such apparatus as 
computer and telephone systems.  Avoiding duplication of such 
expenses (not to mention travel time) should result in lower rates 
and costs charged to consumers of business planning advice, many of 
whom will be struggling to budget for professional fees.48  As the 
project progresses beyond the initial meeting, a fully integrated MDP 
could provide various other efficiencies and quality controls on an 
ongoing basis.  The sharing of risks and rewards among members of 
an MDP would create incentives for the maintenance of a system of 
checks and balances designed to make sure that tasks are handled by 
appropriately qualified individuals and that all members of the team 
are doing their jobs properly.49  Under current regimes, however, 
Brad would have trouble finding this type of business planning firm 
in the United States, because applicable state laws impose barriers to 
fully integrated MDPs.50  The next section examines those obstacles in 
view of recent developments in both the UPL and MDP areas, 
suggesting that changes to the applicable rules are needed in order 
to provide entrepreneurs such as Brad with an opportunity to benefit 
from the services of such a firm. 
III.  REVISITING TRADITIONAL BARRIERS TO MDPS 
A. UPL Statutes 
1. Defining the “Practice of Law” in General 
One of the concerns expressed with respect to the proposed 
formation of fully integrated MDPs is that they might create more 
instances in which nonlawyer participants would be engaging in the 
“practice of law,” in violation of state statutes and court rules limiting 
 
 48 Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In re Enron, supra note 29, at 447 (“I’m 
sure that clients hope that the fees from a one-stop shop would reflect some 
economies of scale that come from shared overhead, eliminated redundancy, and a 
shorter learning curve.”).  In other situations calling for multidisciplinary teams, the 
need for a one-stop shop may be even more acute, especially when indigent clients 
have to use public transportation to get to meetings with service providers.  See 
Brustin, supra note 17, at 787. 
 49 See infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text. 
 50 See generally Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 240-52 (providing 
useful background and an excellent summary of “The Ethical and Regulatory 
Barriers to MDPs in the United States” as they stood in 2000). 
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the authority to practice law to licensed attorneys.51  The widespread 
criticism of UPL provisions as rather vague and difficult to enforce 
complicates the task of assessing the relevance of this issue to the 
MDP debate.52  At the heart of the problem with these statutes is the 
difficulty in drafting a workable definition of the “practice of law.”  
Law permeates so many aspects of both personal lives and 
commercial affairs that, in one way or another, most individuals, 
whether or not they are lawyers, are knowingly or unknowingly 
encountering and interpreting laws on a daily basis.  Although there 
may be consensus that at least some dealings with the law require the 
expertise of trained lawyers, and are therefore within the exclusive 
province of licensed attorneys, defining that province is much easier 
said than done. 
A sampling of “catch all” components of some of the existing 
definitions of the practice of law bears witness to the problems of 
vagueness, circularity, and overbreadth that have plagued UPL 
provisions in this country.  For example, several states’ statutes or 
court rules include within the definition of the practice of law such 
categories as: “the giving of any legal advice”;53 “any action taken for 
others in any matter concerned with the law”;54 and “the application 
of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or 
objectives of another entity or person(s) which require [sic] the 
knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.”55 Tautologies 
 
 51 See supra note 21; see also Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 248 
(observing that the rules prohibiting MDPs are “inextricably linked” to “the 
nationwide interdiction against the practice of law by lay persons”). 
 52 See, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 3, at 6; 
COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N , RECOMMENDATION AND 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 13 (July 2000), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 RECOMMENDATION & RPT.]; Quintin Johnstone, 
Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Power of the State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their 
Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 795 (2003); McBryde, supra note 19, at 211-12; 
Terry, A Primer on MDPs, supra note 7, at 873. 
 53 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-50 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-
101(h)(1) (2004). 
 54 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-50. 
 55 WASH. STATE COURT RULES, RULES OF GEN. APPLICATION, GEN. R. CT. 24 (2004); 
see also Letter from Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, to the Task 
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law 1 (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/ftc.pdf [hereinafter DOJ/FTC Letter] 
(“Courts and bar agencies struggling to define the somewhat amorphous concept of 
the practice of law have come up with several different tests.  For example, the 
‘commonly understood’ test defines the practice of law as composed of activities that 
lawyers have traditionally performed . . . .  [A]nother test used to define the practice 
of law focuses on the existence of an attorney–client relationship . . . .  Other tests 
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such as these beg obvious and significant questions.  Is any advice that 
can affect compliance with laws or affect legal rights or obligations 
ipso facto “legal advice”?  Are not essentially all matters concerned with 
the law?  Are there no matters involving legal principles on which a 
nonlawyer might have more skill and knowledge than a lawyer?56 
As a general proposition, the states’ definitions of the practice of 
law have been seriously flawed for decades.  In the face of the 
proliferation of laws and regulations affecting virtually all industries 
and professions, many states have instituted projects to reconsider 
their “practice of law” definitions.57  Some of these efforts are driven 
by the notion that an overly broad definition is anticompetitive and 
thus harms consumers in terms of cost and access to advice.58  Others 
may be rooted in a desire to better define the practice of law so as to 
expedite the process of prosecuting nonlawyers, since such 
prosecutions are increasingly difficult under patently vague statutes.59  
Regardless of underlying motives, a review of some of the results of 
UPL initiatives over the last few years will provide a better 
understanding of some significant aspects of the MDP debate. 
2. The ABA’s Unsuccessful Attempt at a Model Definition 
Against a backdrop of lack of uniformity and difficulty in 
administering state UPL laws, in 2000 the ABA appointed a Task 
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law.60  In a 
“challenge statement” explaining the mission of the Task Force, ABA 
President Alfred P. Carlton pointed to “the revelation that there are 
an increasing number of situations where nonlawyers are providing 
 
are based upon the client’s belief as to whether or not he or she is receiving legal 
services, whether the activity involves the application of legal knowledge to the 
specific situation of an individual, and whether the services provided affect the 
recipient’s legal rights.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 56 Cf. Seitzinger v. Cmty. Health Network, 676 N.W.2d 426 (Wis. 2004). In 
Seitzinger, the majority interpreted bylaws at issue to require representation of a 
doctor by a licensed attorney in a peer review hearing, concluding that the hearing 
could be expected to “focus on legal issues” or require activities “that resemble the 
practice of law.”  Id. at 438.  In dissent, Chief Justice Abrahamson characterized these 
terms as “vague, broad and undefined phrases,” and argued that the concept that the 
activities they describe can be performed only by a state-licensed attorney “creates an 
unworkable rule of law.”  Id. at 447 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
 57 See supra note 10. 
 58 See DOJ/FTC Letter, supra note 55, at 2. 
 59 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
 60 See TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT 2-3 (adopted Aug. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/taskforce_rpt_803.pdf (on file with author) [hereinafter 
ABA MODEL DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT.]. 
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services that are difficult to categorize under current statutes and case 
law as being, or not being, the delivery of legal services.”61  He further 
observed, “[t]his growing gray area may be partially responsible for 
the spotty enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes across 
the nation and arguably the increasing number of attendant 
problems related to the delivery of services by nonlawyers.”62 
The ABA Task Force was, arguably, given a “protectionist” 
charge.63  The emphasis seemed to be on deriving a definition that 
would make it easier to enjoin nonlawyers from engaging in activities 
perceived to be reserved exclusively for lawyers.  On the other hand, 
the actual wording of the “challenge” was multifaceted, directing the 
Task Force “[t]o determine the best approach for the [ABA] to 
address whether to create a model definition of the practice of law 
that would support the goal to provide the public with better access 
to legal services, be in concert with governmental concerns about 
anticompetitive restraints, and provide a basis to effective 
enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes.”64 
In any event, the draft model definition (“ABA Draft 
Definition”) that the Task Force circulated in September 2002 was 
extremely broad.  It contained a short definition of the “practice of 
law” similar to that found in the statutes quoted above,65 focusing on 
applying legal principles and judgment to advise others on 
circumstances or objectives “that require the knowledge and skill of a 
person trained in the law.”66  The ABA Draft Definition then 
proceeded to list the following four categories of actions that would 
be “presumed” to fall within such definition of the practice of law: 
(1) giving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or 
responsibilities or to those of others; 
 
 61 TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CHALLENGE STATEMENT, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model_def_challenge.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2004) [hereinafter CHALLENGE STATEMENT]; see also ABA MODEL 
DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 60, at 2-3. 
 62 CHALLENGE STATEMENT, supra note 61.  President Carlton did assert, however, 
that since the ABA had adopted policies that related to and were dependent upon a 
definition of the practice of law without ever adopting such a definition, it had not 
rendered such policies “insubstantial or unenforceable when adopted by 
jurisdictions because of that void.” Id. 
 63 Some observers would no doubt argue that a protectionist approach is 
completely consistent with a long tradition of trade protection in the self-regulation 
of the legal profession.  See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 18, at 998 nn.121-25, and 
authorities cited therein. 
 64 CHALLENGE STATEMENT, supra note 61. 
 65 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 66 ABA MODEL DEFINITION, supra note 10, at 1. 
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(2) selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents or 
agreements that affect the legal rights of a person; 
(3) representing a person before an adjudicative body, including, 
but not limited to, preparing or filing documents or conducting 
discovery; or 
(4) negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a 
person.67 
One might have expected the breadth of these presumptions to 
trigger protest from the accounting profession and other trade 
groups providing services that customarily involve legal issues.  
Indeed, many did protest.  For example, attacks on the broad 
language of the proposed definition and calls for exceptions for law-
related work routinely performed by their constituents came from 
spokespersons for accountants,68paralegals,69 law librarians,70 human 
resource management services,71 and real estate professionals.72 
Notably, two high-profile governmental agencies—the United 
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)—also took up the fight for nonlawyers.  On 
December 20, 2002, the DOJ and FTC issued a joint letter to the 
ABA’s Task Force sharply criticizing its proposal.73  In recommending 
that the ABA either substantially narrow or reject the draft definition, 
the DOJ/FTC Letter characterized the definition as “overbroad” and 
warned that its promulgation “could restrain competition between 
lawyers and nonlawyers to provide similar services to American 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Memorandum from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to 
the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/aicpa.pdf [hereinafter AICPA 
Memorandum]. 
 69 See Letter from Karen Belcher & Stephen P. Imondi, National Federation of 
Paralegal Associations, to Arthur Garwin, ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of 
the Practice of Law (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/nfpa.pdf; Letter from Susan D. Alden, Hawaii Paralegal Association, to Arthur 
Garwin, ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 19, 
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/hawaii_paralegals.pdf. 
 70 Letter from Robert L. Oakley, Washington Affairs Representative, American 
Association of Law Libraries, to the Task Force on the Model Definition of the 
Practice of Law (Feb. 04, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/aall.pdf. 
 71 See Letter from Susan R. Meisinger, Society for Human Resources 
Management, to Arthur Garwin, Center for Professional Responsibility, American 
Bar Association, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/shrm.pdf. 
 72 See Letter from James R. Maher, American Land Title Association, to Arthur 
Garwin, Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association (Dec. 20, 
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/alta.pdf. 
 73 DOJ/FTC Letter, supra note 55. 
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consumers.”74  The DOJ and FTC predicted that if the ABA Draft 
Definition were adopted by states it would be “likely to raise costs for 
consumers and limit their competitive choices.”75  Even though they 
recognized the legitimacy of the Task Force’s efforts to protect 
consumers from harm when nonlawyers attempt to provide services 
in “circumstances requiring the knowledge and skill of a person 
trained in the law,” the DOJ and FTC concluded that “the proposed 
definition is not in the public interest because the harms it imposes 
on consumers by limiting competition are likely much greater than 
any consumer harm that it prevents.”76 
In support of this conclusion, the DOJ and FTC offered several 
examples of activities that they apparently believed might be 
inappropriately included within the “practice of law” under the ABA 
Draft Definition.  Among other things, the two agencies suggested 
that the following activities by nonlawyers should not be considered 
the unauthorized practice of law: explanation and negotiation of the 
terms of real estate contracts by realtors; selection and drafting of 
forms of living wills by hospital staff; interpretation of federal and 
state tax codes, family law codes, and general partnership laws by tax 
return preparers and accountants, and associated advice to their 
clients incorporating this “legal information”; and the giving of 
advice by investment bankers and other business planners to their 
clients that included “information about various laws.”77 
The DOJ/FTC Letter cites a purportedly significant difference 
between giving “advice or counsel” on legal matters and providing 
“legal information,” implying that the latter should not be deemed 
the “practice” of law.78  However, examples of such “informational” 
activities, which the DOJ and FTC feared would be unjustifiably 
encompassed by the Draft Definition, include interpretation of laws 
and resulting rights and obligations.79  Contrary to the agencies’ 
apparent intent, these examples suggest that attempts to draw a 
meaningful distinction between providing advice and counsel on 
legal matters and providing “legal information” are futile, unless the 
 
 74 Id. at 2. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 4-5. 
 78 Id. at 4. 
 79 See, e.g., DOJ/FTC Letter, supra note 55, at 4 (stating that “realtors routinely fill 
out and explain purchase and sale agreements . . . .  [T]hey may explain to consumers 
the ramifications of failing to have the home inspection done on time, the meaning of 
the mortgage contingency clause, and other portions of the agreement.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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so-called “information” is confined to merely stating that an 
applicable law exists.  Even then, the assumption that a nonlawyer has 
identified all applicable law and all pertinent legal issues may in many 
cases present serious hazards to the consumer. 
In the business transactions context, the details of doing 
business and complying with the law are so interconnected that many 
nonlawyers providing business advice must have some working 
knowledge of pertinent laws and prevailing interpretations of laws.  
Attempting to address this reality, some portions of the DOJ/FTC 
Letter suggest that a bright-line definition of the practice of law 
might be possible.  Other portions of the Letter advocate a “rough 
justice” balancing of possible harms and benefits to clients where, by 
recognizing the competency of nonlawyers to handle certain law-
related tasks, those professionals would be allowed to participate in 
areas in which they have demonstrated skill.80  In the end, the DOJ 
and FTC did not propose a specific practice of law definition.  The 
DOJ/FTC Letter simply rejected the ABA Draft Definition, asserting 
that the Task Force had drafted an overbroad and anticompetitive 
definition without any evidence in support of the public’s need to 
have nonlawyers excluded from many of the activities appearing to be 
within its ambit.81 
Affected nonlegal industries, the DOJ, and the FTC were not the 
only critics of the ABA Draft Definition.  In fact, significant negative 
commentary came from sections and committees within the ABA 
itself, including: the Section on Dispute Resolution;82 the Section of 
Antitrust Law;83 the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section;84 the 
Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service;85 the Standing 
 
 80 Id. at 5 (citing, as examples, the advice that may be given by tenants 
associations experienced in landlord–tenant law, employees experienced in state 
labor law or safety regulations, income tax preparers and accountants on federal and 
state tax issues, and investment bankers and other business planners). 
 81 Id. at 2, 7. 
 82 Letter from Bruce Meyerson, Section of Dispute Resolution, American Bar 
Association, to Arthur Garwin, Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar 
Association (December 20, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/dispute.pdf. 
 83 SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS FROM THE SECTION OF 
ANTRITRUST LAW, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/antitrust.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2004). 
 84 Letter from Dennis I. Belcher, Chair, Section of Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law, American Bar Association, to Arthur Garwin, ABA Task Force on the 
Model Definition of the Practice of Law (March 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/rppt.pdf. 
 85 Memorandum from Debbie Segal, Chair, Standing Committee on Pro Bono 
and Public Service, American Bar Association, to ABA Task Force on the Model 
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Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants;86 the Standing 
Committee on Group and Prepaid Legal Services;87 and the Standing 
Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services.88  In addition, various 
organizations promoting increased access to affordable legal services 
for clients of low and moderate income characterized the ABA Draft 
Definition as inconsistent with that goal.89  Both the quantity and 
quality of the criticism leveled at the Task Force’s proposal (including 
numerous compelling arguments that the Draft Definition suffered 
from vagueness and circularity) attest to the difficulty of the task with 
which it was charged.  This sentiment was well captured in the 
comments of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, 
which pointed out the over-inclusiveness of, and other problems with, 
the proposed language.90  Opining that “it is neither possible nor 
desirable to adopt a single definition of the practice of law that will 
work even reasonably well in the many and varied contexts in which 
some definition might be useful,” and suggesting “that the effort be 
abandoned as unneeded and unworkable,”91 the Association 
concluded: 
[I]t is our considered view that no single definition of the practice 
 
Definition of the Practice of Law (February 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/pbps.pdf. 
 86 Letter from L. Jonathan Ross, Chair, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants, American Bar Association, to Lish Whitson, Chair, ABA Task 
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (January 21, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/sclaid.pdf. 
 87 Letter from W. Anthony Jenkins, Chair, Standing Committee on Group and 
Prepaid Legal Services, American Bar Association, to Lish Whitson, Chair, ABA Task 
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (February 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/gpls.pdf. 
 88 Memorandum from Mary K. Ryan, Chair, Standing Committee on the Delivery 
of Legal Services, American Bar Association, to Lish Whitson, Chair, ABA Task Force 
on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (December 19, 2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/scdls.pdf. 
 89 See, e.g., Letter from Yvonne Martinez Vega et al., District of Columbia Legal 
Community Members, to Arthur Garwin, ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of 
the Practice of Law (February 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/dclsc2.pdf; Comments Submitted by 
Thomas M. Gordon, Senior Counsel, HALT, to ABA Task Force on the Model 
Definition of the Practice of Law (December 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/halt.pdf; Letter from Clint Lyons et al., 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, to Lish Whitson, Chair, ABA Task 
Force on the Definition of the Practice of Law, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/nlada.pdf. 
 90 Letter from W. William Hodes, Chair, & Anthony E. Davis, President, 
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, to ABA Task Force on the Model 
Definition of the Practice of Law (December 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/aprl.pdf. 
 91 Id. 
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of law should be prepared or published by the ABA.  The state 
courts and the state legislatures have developed a variety of 
definitions over a long period of time, tailored in many instances 
to meet specific situations.  Although the problems of definition 
discussed in this letter have always been present in those efforts to 
one degree or another, the problems only get worse—not 
better—when an attempt is made to force all variations into a 
single nationalized mode.92 
Interestingly, the Association’s perspective echoes the 
sentiments expressed by the ABA’s MDP Commission some three 
years earlier, when, in the face of criticism that a definition the 
Commission had proposed93 was overbroad, observed that it may not 
be advisable to attempt to draft a uniform practice of law definition.94 
In the end, the Task Force recommended that the attempt to 
craft a “model” definition be abandoned, and urged instead that 
every jurisdiction adopt its own definition of the practice of law.95  
The Task Force did offer some general advice to states in 
undertaking this task; namely, that each jurisdiction’s definition 
“should include the basic premise that the practice of law is the 
application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or 
objectives of another person or entity,” and that each jurisdiction 
“should determine who may provide services that are included within 
the jurisdiction’s definition of the practice of law and under what 
circumstances, based upon the potential harm and benefit to the 
public.”96  The ABA Task Force suggested that the determination of 
who may provide legal services “should include consideration of 
minimum qualifications, competence and accountability.”97  While 
well intentioned, these recommendations merely restate obvious and 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 See COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM BAR ASS’N, REPORT, APP. A 
(1999), at http://www.abanet.org /cpr/mdpreport.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) 
[hereinafter ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RPT.]. 
 94 ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 POSTSCRIPT, supra note 9, at 3 (“Given the complexity 
of the lawyer and nonlawyer services offered to clients today, it may be impossible to 
satisfactorily define the practice of law on a national level.  The composition of such 
a definition may be best left to each individual jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Terry, A 
Primer on MDPs, supra note 7, at 937 (reporting that “virtually every witness” asked 
about the practice of law definition at the MDP Commission hearings conceded that 
“there is no effective UPL definition”). 
 95 ABA MODEL DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 60, 
at 1.  The recommendations were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 
2003.  See Homepage of Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model_def_home.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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broad propositions and goals, and provide further support for the 
conclusion that, at least outside of the litigation arena,98 it may be 
impossible to craft a precise and balanced definition of the practice 
of law for purposes of confining such practice to licensed attorneys. 
The difficulties encountered in defining the practice of law and 
in identifying the persons who may engage in such practice are 
evident from some of the statements and examples included in the 
ABA Task Force Report that accompanied its recommendations.  The 
Task Force concluded, for example, that states were, in its view, better 
positioned to “weigh the factors provided in the framework 
[suggested by its general recommendations] in a manner that is best 
suited to resolving the harm/benefit equation for its citizens.”99  It 
also noted that “[p]otential for harm is too quickly discounted by 
those who want to expand the field of who may provide services 
within the definition of the practice of law and too easily found by 
those who want to restrict the practice of law to lawyers.”100  
Suggesting an approach similar to that recommended by the 
DOJ/FTC Letter, the ABA Task Force explained: 
The process of balancing harm and benefit is not an easy one.  
There is no simple formula.  It requires an exercise of discretion 
and judgment based on the best available evidence.  Each 
jurisdiction should weigh concerns for public protection and 
consumer safety, access to justice, preservation of individual 
choice, judicial economy, maintenance of professional standards, 
efficient operation of the market place, costs of regulation and 
implementation of public policy.101 
Leaving aside the evolving issue of whether the ABA Task Force 
and the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers are correct 
in promoting a state-by-state approach to defining the practice of law, 
rather than a more uniform national standard,102 it is clear that 
 
 98 See infra notes 108-59 and accompanying text. 
 99 ABA MODEL DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 60, 
at 3. 
 100 Id. at 5, n.13. 
 101 Id. at 5. 
 102 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 151 (speculating that continued 
efforts by state bars to maintain the prohibition of MDPs might “provoke a serious 
movement for a national bar”); Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal 
and State Components: National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 
453 (1997) (suggesting bifurcation of the governance of admission to practice law 
based on distinction between federal and state law); Fred C. Zacharias, Reform or 
Professional Responsibility as Usual?: Whither the Institutions of Regulation and Discipline, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505 (predicting that a more open, nationally conscious, and 
coordinated approach to the regulation of the legal profession will be forthcoming 
in the twenty-first century).  But cf. Painter, supra note 29, at 188-90 (recognizing that 
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anyone striving to craft a truly balanced and functional definition of 
the practice of law (with its corresponding UPL regime) faces a 
formidable task.  Apparently hoping to bring a measure of 
pragmatism to this complex task, the ABA Task Force pronounced 
that “[t]he basic assumption of the Task Force is that jurisdictions will 
apply common sense in defining who may be authorized to provide 
services that are included within the definition of the practice of law 
and who does not need to be regulated.”103 
Curiously, as an example of the intended application of 
common sense, the Task Force offered the following: “[A]dvice given 
by one neighbor to another regarding zoning issues or a mechanic’s 
comments on warranty coverage is not conduct that needs to be 
regulated.”104  It is inconceivable that the Task Force meant to suggest 
that zoning and warranty matters are always simple.  Beyond that, the 
Task Force’s confidence in identifying this situation as not requiring 
regulation must be grounded in more than just the notion that it 
poses no material competition to the practicing bar.  Is the intended 
message of the Task Force’s example simply that “small potatoes” 
matters do not merit regulatory oversight?  One would hope not, as 
the advice in question might be of great economic or other 
significance to the advisee.  Is the thinking that regulation is 
inappropriate because the advice-giving neighbor is not charging a 
fee or advertising his availability to give such advice?  That will be of 
little consolation to the advisee if the advice is erroneous. 
Perhaps the idea is that no need for regulation exists in the 
neighbor example because the advisee should have no reasonable 
expectation that he is getting thoughtful legal advice in this 
situation.105  That reasoning is predicated on the questionable 
assumption that the “client” can appreciate the complexity of the 
matters involved and judge the experience level and expertise of the 
advice-giver.  It would also seem inconsistent with the ABA’s general 
position that the public needs advice on legal matters from persons 
“trained in the law.”106 
 
national regulation of MDPs “is theoretically possible,” but finding more merit in the 
state-by-state initiatives suggested by Dean Powell, utilizing principles of “federalism 
and jurisdictional competition,” and advocating that states “experiment with their 
own approaches . . . with the protection of the public, not lawyers or accountants, 
foremost in mind”). 
 103 ABA MODEL DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 60, 
at 5. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Cf. Keatinge, supra note 6, at 723 (advocating the client’s understanding of the 
relationship as the best benchmark for defining the practice of law). 
 106 See ABA MODEL DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 
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Considering the celebrated concern in the MDP debate over the 
“core values” of independent professional judgment, avoiding 
conflicts, confidentiality, and, albeit belatedly, competence, it is 
difficult to comprehend why the ABA Task Force so readily condoned 
the neighbor’s dispensation of legal advice.  The neighbor might lack 
the competence to provide counsel on legal issues and may even have 
a conflict of interest (for instance, with respect to the zoning issues).  
In addition, the neighbor may not have perceived any duty to hold 
the conversation in confidence.  Needless to say, the advisee would be 
in better hands if he consulted a lawyer with experience in the legal 
matters involved and who was accustomed to avoiding conflicts of 
interest.  The client might also receive better advice from an engineer 
employed by a real estate development company who had worked on 
a multitude of construction projects and who was familiar with the 
pertinent issues.  Indeed, the engineer might in some cases give 
better advice than a licensed attorney with little experience in zoning 
matters.107  Query whether common sense supports a system of UPL 
regulation that would find no violation by the neighbor who may be 
inexperienced on such matters (and perhaps have a conflict of 
interest), but would find a violation by the experienced engineer 
(unless he happens to be the neighbor).  The ABA has left it to the 
states to contemplate such matters. 
3.  The Utah Legislature’s “Attention-Getter” 
Ironically, the Utah legislature may have succeeded in putting 
forth a promising, pragmatic definition of the practice of law without 
actually intending to do so.108  In May of 2003, legislation was enacted, 
to become effective on May 4, 2004, amending Utah’s prior UPL 
statute.109  The new legislation provided that: 
(1) The term “practice of law” means appearing as an advocate in 
 
60, at 5-7 (discussing “Minimum Qualifications” and “Competence”). 
 107 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2004).  Cf. ABA MODEL 
DEFINITION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION AND RPT., supra note 60, at 5 (“While the 
Comment to [MRPC Rule 1.1] states that ‘[a] lawyer can provide adequate 
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study,’ it is nevertheless true 
that there are nonlawyers whose specialized knowledge and experience may make 
them as competent as many lawyers in certain areas related to the law.”). 
 108 The Executive Director of the Utah State Bar observed that at least some Utah 
legislators have described the referred-to legislation as “not really intended to define 
the practice of law.”  Stephanie Francis Cahill, What is Law Practice? Utah Defines a 
Lawyer’s Job to Meet Middle-Class Legal Needs, A.B.A. J. EREPORT (March 28, 2003), at 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m28upl.html (on file author); see infra 
notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
 109 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-9-101 (2003) (defining the unauthorized practice of 
law prior to the Utah legislature’s 2003 legislation). 
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any criminal proceeding or before any court of record in this state 
in a representative capacity on behalf of another person. 
(2) Only persons who have been admitted by the supreme court 
of this state to practice law may practice or hold themselves out as 
licensed to practice law in this state. 
(3) A person may not use “J.D.,” “Esq.,” “attorney,” or “attorney-at-
law” on business cards, signs, advertisements, or official 
documents as those terms are used to indicate status as an 
attorney, unless licensed to practice law.110 
It would be difficult for the DOJ, the FTC or other parties 
focused on avoiding unreasonable restraints on competition to find 
significant fault with this set of provisions (the “2003 Utah UPL 
Provisions”).  The advocacy-based aspect of the definition seems 
reasonable in restricting participation as an advocate in civil or 
criminal litigation to trained and licensed attorneys, even though 
many professionals from different fields deal with interpretation of 
substantive laws on a regular basis, and might thereby be able to 
demonstrate competence in particular areas of the law.  Trial lawyers 
need to be well-versed in not only the substantive areas of law at issue 
in a case, but also the often complex rules of procedure and 
evidence, and must excel in the special skills required to uncover, 
assemble and present facts in controversy.111  They must also have the 
ability to see both sides of contested issues and anticipate all 
arguments the opposition might advance.112  Moreover, litigation 
attorneys are often called upon to make on-the-spot judgments on 
matters of law that can instantly and significantly affect legal rights, 
such as whether to make an objection in open court, and on what 
grounds. 
The second prong of the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions prohibits a 
person from holding himself out as an attorney, drawing a line that 
 
 110 2003 Utah Laws 339 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-9-102 (2003) and 
repealed by 2004 Utah H.B. 234). 
 111 Cf. Green, supra note 24, at 1148 (“With limited exceptions, only lawyers may 
represent clients in courtroom settings and their training uniquely qualifies them to 
do so well.”); Matthew A. Melone, Income Tax Practice and Certified Public Accountants: 
The Case for a Status Based Exemption from State Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 11 
AKRON TAX J. 47, 49 (1995) (generally arguing that UPL restrictions should not apply 
to income tax practice by certified public accountants, but electing not to address 
practice before judiciary bodies, stating, “A reasoned analysis of this area of practice 
requires a detailed analysis of the rules of attorney–client and work product 
privileges as well as the issue of whether certified public accountants can effectively 
circumnavigate the applicable rules of procedure.”). 
 112 Transactional and other lawyers also need this key skill, and it is clearly one of 
the contributions they bring to the table in business planning, negotiations, and 
other client representation settings. 
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not even free market advocates should balk at, as it essentially 
amounts to a ban on false advertising and misrepresentation.113  The 
person holding himself out as an attorney is making a representation 
about his degree of formal legal training, and the public should not 
be misled about that degree of training.  In addition, this “holding 
out,” like the preceding advocacy-based definition, presents a clear 
rule that should be relatively easy to enforce. 
While the 2003 Utah Provisions are appealing in their bright-line 
nature and seeming ease of administrability, these very aspects 
present some areas of potential concern.  Excluded from the 
“practice of law” under these provisions are such activities as 
representation before administrative bodies,114 spotting legal issues 
and determining legal requirements in planning transactions, 
negotiating and drafting complex legal documents, and advising 
clients on matters involving interpretations of and compliance with 
laws, regulations, and the associated liability considerations.  There is 
reason to believe that the Utah legislature never seriously intended to 
exclude such activities from the definition.  Informal legislative 
history indicates that enacting this narrow definition was simply a 
means to accelerate the efforts of a commission which had been 
appointed by the Utah Supreme Court to study a perceived lack of 
affordable legal services for middle-class citizens.115 
While many bar members have applauded the goal of making 
legal services more affordable and available to persons of modest 
means,116 some questioned the propriety of what was perceived to be 
the Utah legislature’s forced-discussion approach.  Lish Whitson, 
chairperson of the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the 
Practice of Law, commented in the spring of 2003, “I’ve read the law, 
and I was fairly appalled . . . it just seems to me that it’s a mischievous 
way to accomplish a goal.  It’s one of those clever knee-jerk things 
 
 113 Cf. ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RPT., supra note 93, at 4 (observing that in the 
United Kingdom there is no ban on nonlawyers practicing law comparable to the 
prohibitions in the United States, but there is a ban on falsely holding oneself out as 
a lawyer). 
 114 Within reasonable limits, nonlawyer representation of persons in certain types 
of administrative agency matters may be acceptable.  The ABA Draft Definition, for 
example, highlighted as one instance of “practicing law” representing a person 
before an administrative agency which “acts in an adjudicative capacity,” suggesting 
that a more ministerial function might be less troublesome from a UPL perspective.  
See ABA MODEL DEFINITION, supra note 10, at 1. 
 115 See Cahill, supra note 108, at 1 (quoting Utah Representative Stephen 
Urquhart, himself a member of the Utah Bar and one of the sponsors of the 
legislation, as saying, “This is an attention-getter.”). 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 2 (quoting members of the Utah bar and other ABA activists 
expressing this sentiment); see also sources cited supra note 12. 
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that perhaps could have been better thought through.”117  In fact, in 
March 2004, the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions were repealed and prior 
(more traditionally flawed) Utah statutory UPL provisions 
reinstated.118  The purported legislative strong-arm tactics apparently 
succeeded in prompting action, as the Utah Supreme Court, on 
March 17, 2004, proposed a revised definition of the practice of law 
that appears to reflect a better appreciation for modern perspectives 
on access to legal advice.  But, the proposed definition suffers from 
some of the same circularity and overbreadth problems as other UPL 
definitions.119 
Even if the enactment and preemptive repeal of the 2003 Utah 
UPL Provisions were mischievous in intent, the provisions themselves 
were not appalling.  With the addition of advocacy in administrative, 
as well as judicial proceedings, the Utah definition might arguably be 
workable and even superior to the circular, vague and consequently 
overbroad definitions found in most UPL provisions.  After all, the 
 
 117 Cahill, supra note 108, at 2; see also id. at 1 (quoting the executive director of 
the Utah State Bar as saying, with respect to the Utah practice of law definition, that 
“it was intended to force the issue of creating greater access . . . .”). 
 118 2004 Utah H.B. 234 (enacted March 15, 2004) (repealing 2003 Utah Laws 339 
and extending the expiration date of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-9-101 (2003) to May 3, 
2007). 
 119 See UTAH LAWYER AND DISCIPLINARY R. 6.1 (proposed March 17, 2004).  This 
rule defines the practice of law as follows: 
Rule 6.1 [Proposed] 
(a) Except as set forth in subsection (c) of this Rule, only persons who 
are active members in good standing of the Utah State Bar may engage 
in the practice of law in Utah. 
(b) For purposes of this Rule: 
(1) The “practice of law” is the representation of the interests of 
another person by informing, counseling, advising, assisting, or 
advocating for that person through application of the law and 
associated legal principles to that person’s facts and circumstances. 
(2) The “law” is the collective body of declarations by governmental 
authorities that establish a person’s rights, duties, constraints and 
freedoms and consists primarily of: 
(i) constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations and similarly enacted declarations; and 
(ii) decisions, orders and deliberations of adjudicative, legislative and 
executive bodies of government that have authority to interpret, 
prescribe and determine a person’s rights, duties, constraints and 
freedoms. 
The rule also contains thirteen exceptions. R. 6.1(c)(1)-(13). The Utah 
Supreme Court’s definition is based in part upon the treatment of this issue by the 
Washington State Bar Association. See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, UTAH SUPREME COURT, REPORT ON THE DEFINITION OF “THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW” 8, available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/comments/LP%20Final%20Report.pdf 
(Aug. 18, 2003). 
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2003 Utah UPL Provisions would have precluded nonlawyers from 
falsely holding themselves out as attorneys, and permitted only 
licensed attorneys to serve the traditional role of “barrister” in 
advocacy settings, a role for which trained attorneys are generally 
viewed as uniquely skilled.120  The vast gray areas121 involving the 
“practice of law” outside of contested proceedings (for example, 
planning business transactions and negotiating and drafting 
contracts) would be left to the rough refinements of the market.  If 
lawyers really do a better job in such areas than other professionals, 
consumers will recognize that fact, hire the lawyers, and pay them 
fees commensurate with their superior skills.122  Indeed, the free 
market approach was accepted during much of America’s history, as 
UPL bans did not become prevalent in the United States until the 
1930s.123  Now that they have existed for several decades, some 
 
 120 Cf. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 625-35 
(observing that while there are great similarities, in terms of prominence in the 
“legal professional,” between “trial lawyers” in the United States and “barristers” in 
the United Kingdom, the role of “business lawyer” in the United States differs 
markedly from the role of “solicitor” in the UK and similar non-litigators in other 
Western European countries, and noting that the United States is rather unique in 
viewing the lawyer’s role as central in business deals); Jones & Manning, supra note 6, 
at 1171 (noting that the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the ABA in 1908 
dealt with professional norms “primarily in litigation settings”); Christopher L. 
Noble, Multidisciplinary Practice: A Construction Lawyer’s Perspective, 33 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 413, 423 (2000) (suggesting that the MDP debate should include consideration 
of the diversity of relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers, based on the 
particular types of services and/or clients involved, and that a distinction might be 
made “between the solicitor-like services of the transactional lawyer and the barrister-
like services of the trial lawyer”). 
 121 See Powell, The Lesson of Enron, supra note 28, at 1301 (describing what he calls 
“gray lawyers” as “lawyers who practice tax advising, business consulting, economic 
planning, business advising and the like,” and asserting that except for the fact that 
they hold law licenses and describe themselves as lawyers, they do not practice law or 
“at least, they do not wish to be regulated as though they are practicing law”); see also 
Bryant Garth & Carol Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of Globalization, 52 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 903, 914-16 (2002) (describing as “stealth MDPs” non-law 
professional service providers that have law-trained employees perform various 
consulting services traditionally performed by lawyers). 
 122 See, e.g., Honorable Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End of the Legal World as We Know 
It?, 20 PACE L. REV. 21 (1999) (suggesting that consideration be given to a narrower 
definition of the regulated practice of law that more closely resembles its original 
litigation/advocacy focus, and advocating for market choice regarding business and 
tax services that accountants might in some instances handle better than lawyers); 
Fischel, supra note 15 (also encouraging a more free market/free competition 
approach). 
 123 See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1981) 
(noting, among other things, that of the few jurisdictions with pre-1930 UPL bans, 
“most dealt only with nonlawyer appearances in court or with legal activity by certain 
specified officials such as bailiffs, court clerks, and sheriffs”). 
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commentators exploring their effects have seriously questioned both 
the desirability and validity of modern bans, recommending that they 
be eliminated or substantially narrowed.124 
In practical terms, however, a completely free market approach 
to the delivery of legal services in twenty-first century America has 
fundamental shortcomings.  Such an approach implicitly requires 
that many or most individuals will grasp the subtleties of issues that 
are often challenging to even the most sophisticated professionals, 
and be able to assess the ability of would-be advisors to address those 
issues.  The free market approach also rests on an assumption that 
the availability of legal advice from nonlawyers is necessary to prevent 
many citizens from going without any advice in situations where it is 
needed.  There is simply too much at stake when dealing with legal 
rights and obligations to trust that most members of the public, 
particularly those unaccustomed to paying for professional advice, 
will be in a sound position to distinguish competent from 
incompetent nonlawyer advisors on legal matters.  Of course, they 
may also be unable to distinguish between competent and 
incompetent lawyers.  But licensed attorneys generally have been 
subjected to a rigorous course of study before obtaining a law degree, 
have passed a bar examination, and have been monitored by 
disciplinary and accrediting agencies.  These combined measures are 
expressly designed to produce some level of competence among legal 
practitioners.125 
In view of the vast range of transactional and other work that 
involves the interpretation of complex laws and regulations, and that 
falls outside of the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions’ definition of the 
practice of law, the definition is too narrow.  For example, the choice-
of-business-entity issue confronting Brad and Janet in the 
hypothetical fact pattern described in Part II above is a frequently 
occurring issue for a business lawyer.  The determination of the 
proper entity should depend on a balancing of various tax factors, 
non-tax business and legal issues, and practical considerations.126  
Though a familiar topic, choice of entity analysis is often not a simple 
task, and normally requires advice and assistance from multiple 
 
 124 See, e.g., Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An 
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2599 (1999); 
Needham, supra note 21, at 1331. 
 125 Cf. Needham, supra note 21, at 1330 (noting that the usefulness of the bar 
exam as a measure of competency has become controversial, but arguing that 
“requiring a bar exam at least assures that individuals passing the exam can write 
coherent sentences and perform basic legal analysis”). 
 126 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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professionals on a variety of issues, both legal and nonlegal. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Verne,127 
recently addressed the question of whether choice of entity and entity 
formation work constitutes the practice of law.  The case involved 
business structure assistance given by Verne, a certified public 
accountant (“CPA”), to two men operating a power-washing 
company.  Verne recommended the formation of a limited liability 
company (“LLC”) and drafted articles of organization for the 
formation of the entity, using a form available from the Ohio 
Secretary of State.  Unfortunately, Verne apparently did not counsel 
the owners of the LLC to enter into a written “operating agreement” 
(the LLC equivalent of a partnership agreement) that would specify 
their respective rights and obligations and other pertinent matters 
regarding their business organization.128  When the two owners had a 
“falling out,” one of them sought the advice of an attorney (who also 
happened to be a certified public accountant) who, upon learning 
that Verne had done the entity formation work without a law license, 
filed a grievance with the Columbus Bar Association.  The Ohio 
Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
recommended that the Ohio Supreme Court issue an injunction 
enjoining Verne from the unauthorized practice of law and order 
reimbursement of costs and expenses.129  Explaining its decision to 
grant the requested relief, the court cited prior Ohio authority for 
the proposition that “[f]or a layperson to draft documents creating a 
business entity on another’s behalf is unquestionably the 
unauthorized practice of law.”130  In response to Verne’s assertion that 
a CPA was competent to advise clients on the creation of entity 
organizational documents, the court stated: 
While we recognize that certified public accountants perform a 
valuable function in advising on financial matters in the 
formation of a company, such as how best to structure a business 
entity for tax benefits, there are still many remaining issues that 
require legal analysis in choosing a business structure.  This case 
highlights the dangers when those lines are blurred.  In this case, 
respondent helped his clients choose a business structure, a 
decision that ordinarily requires a significant amount of legal 
 
 127 788 N.E.2d 1064 (Ohio 2003). 
 128 Id. at 1064. 
 129 Id. at 1065. 
 130 Id.  But cf. Fla. Bar re Advisory Op.—Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans, 
571 So. 2d 430, 432-33 (Fla. 1990) (rejecting opinion that would have precluded 
accountants, actuaries, and insurance underwriters from preparing and filing 
pension plans as permitted under ERISA). 
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judgment in addition to tax and other accounting considerations.  
Clients need to know the legal differences between and 
formalities of available structures and then be advised according 
to their best interests, taking into account personal and practical 
concerns, not just tax consequences.  Where there is more than 
one principal involved in the venture, the existing and potential 
conflicts also must be assessed.131 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis persuasively supports the 
proposition that the involvement of lawyers can be essential to a well-
balanced choice of entity and entity formation project.  In addition to 
the requisite substantive knowledge of legal matters, the court 
emphasized the need for the parties to be cognizant of potential 
conflicts of interest, which have been underscored by rules of 
attorney conduct that govern the actions of those acting as 
intermediaries between principals organizing a business entity.132 
Under the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions, Verne’s work for the 
owners of the power-washing company would not have constituted 
the unauthorized practice of law, assuming he did not hold himself 
out as an attorney.  The advice the clients received from Verne 
exemplifies the risks inherent in a UPL rule limited to prohibiting 
litigation by nonlawyers.  Under the more traditional Ohio law,133 as 
interpreted by that state’s supreme court, Verne’s work crossed the 
UPL line, even though the court acknowledged that, as a CPA, Verne 
had a legitimate role to play in the overall choice of entity analysis, 
 
 131 Verne, 788 N.E.2d at 1065. 
 132 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 28 (2004); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 3 (1999). 
 133 See, e.g., Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 35 N.E.2d 435, 436 (Ohio 1941) 
(holding that real estate broker’s filling in blank spaces on pre-printed real estate 
contract forms which had been prepared in the past by an attorney did not constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law because filling out the form agreement was “merely 
the clerical service of recording the stated agreement”); Land Title Abstract & Trust 
Co. v. Dworkin, 193 N.E. 650, 652 (Ohio 1934) (“The practice of law is not limited to 
the conduct of cases in court.  It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other 
papers incident to actions and special proceedings and the management of such 
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in 
addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and in 
general all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with 
the law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Davis, 590 
N.E.2d 916, 917-18 (Ohio 1992) (holding that in light of Ohio Supreme Court’s 
definition of “practice of law,” as set forth in Land Title & Trust Co., preparing articles 
of incorporation for a doctor, assisting in the transfer of assets to the corporation 
formed, and participating as the doctor’s representative in contract negotiations 
constituted the unauthorized practice of law).  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4705.07 (West 2004) (prohibiting individuals from holding themselves out or 
representing that they are an attorney or authorized to practice law). 
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especially with respect to tax implications.134  The court in essence 
suggested that accountants are critical to tax analysis, when, in 
speaking of “tax and other accounting considerations,” it implied that 
working with the tax law is practicing accounting rather than 
practicing law.135  Many tax lawyers would properly disagree.  Indeed, 
courts and commentators have, in the UPL area, struggled for some 
time with the reality that tax consequences often turn on a blending 
of determinations based on not just tax accounting principles but 
also the application of non-tax laws to the facts presented.136 
How it is that giving tax advice—advice on the operation and 
interpretation of laws commonly acknowledged as exceedingly 
complex137—has come to be accepted as work that accountants can do 
without significant fear of being prosecuted for engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law138 could be the subject of a separate 
article itself.139  For purposes of this Article, a few points in that regard 
have a significant bearing on the MDP debate.  To begin with, some 
commentators suggest that several decades ago the legal profession 
came to view tax return preparation work as not sufficiently profitable 
and willingly abdicated such work to accountants.140  Perhaps this also 
 
 134 Verne, 788 N.E.2d at 1065. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See, e.g., Melone, supra note 111, at 60-82 (reviewing case law and discussing 
conflicting views on the extent to which interpretation of non-tax laws affects income 
tax practice and the relative ability of lawyers and certified public accountants to 
engage in such practice). 
 137 See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing federal tax law as “a field beset with invisible 
boomerangs”); Donahue’s Accounting & Tax Service, S.C. v. Ryno, 674 N.W.2d 681 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t is clear to this court that the [Internal Revenue Code] is 
incomprehensible without the assistance of a qualified expert in tax law.”). 
 138 See, e.g., Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that the 
preparation of tax forms is not considered the practice of law); Daly, Choosing Wise 
Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 252-61 (citing and describing various difficulties in 
attempting to attack and refer to tax work by accounting firms as UPL violations, 
including the existence of federal preemption issues and fact that “UPL 
jurisprudence is a quagmire”); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 106-11 
(discussing ability of accountants to engage in such areas of federal tax practice as 
return preparation, tax advice and planning and tax controversy work under federal 
statutes, rules, and regulations that preempt state UPL restrictions and noting lack of 
successful UPL complaints against Big Five accounting firms for their expanding 
delivery of tax-related services). 
 139 See, e.g., Alwin & Eckerly, supra note 6; Michael J. Herzog, Tax Dispute 
Resolution: The Time Is Ripe to Allow Certified Public Accountant Access to the Tribunal, 18 
J.L. & COM. 355 (1999); Melone, supra note 111; Schwab, supra note 29. 
 140 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 106 n.122; Lalli, supra note 17, at 
286 (observing that “accountants emerged to prove to the market that they could do 
the job more efficiently than lawyers”). 
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reflected a general apprehension among some lawyers regarding 
complex “number crunching.”141  Given the natural relationship 
between tax planning and return preparation work, this reluctant 
attitude toward return preparation evolved into de facto 
relinquishment of any monopoly lawyers may have been able to claim 
at the expense of accountants in the field of tax advice.142 
Many law schools do not list federal tax law as a required 
course.143  And, as the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants noted in its criticism of the ABA Draft Definition of the 
practice of law, the multi-state bar exam does not test federal tax 
law.144  Yet, American law schools typically offer numerous elective tax 
courses, and many offer an LL.M. degree in taxation.145  The country 
boasts many accomplished and well respected tax lawyers.  A market 
clearly exists for the services of tax lawyers because tax laws are 
complicated, are often difficult to apply equitably to similar but 
arguably distinct fact patterns, and frequently present a daunting 
challenge when it comes to planning a transaction and predicting the 
ultimate tax consequences should the government question the 
purported treatment of the transaction. 
Tax planning, then, is more than literal application of tax 
accounting rules to “run the numbers,” although that computational 
task is often critical.  The excesses of off-balance sheet financial 
accounting revealed in recent major audit failures,146 coupled with the 
 
 141 Cf. Gevurtz, supra note 37, at 50 (including in his Business Planning text for law 
students a subsection entitled “Overcoming the Fear of Numbers: An Introduction to 
Valuation”). 
 142 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 106 n.122; see also Alwin & Eckerly, 
supra note 6, at 257 n.3 (identifying several business planning and family planning 
“practice areas” as being “shared by accountants and lawyers”).  While the giving of 
tax planning and advice by accountants seems to have been an area free from 
successful UPL prosecution, preparation by accountants of documents to implement 
tax planning advice is more likely to be characterized as UPL.  See, e.g., Verne, 788 
N.E.2d at 1064; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 111-12. 
 143 See WILLIAM B. POWERS, A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 12 
(1986) (indicating that only about 29% of the 124 law schools studied between 1974 
and 1975, and only about 31% of those studied between 1984 and 1986 listed 
taxation as a required course).  See also Summer Duke and David Achtenberg, 
unpublished report (on file with author) conducted at University of Missouri-Kansas 
City School of Law on required courses of selected law schools (2002) (showing that 
only two of the forty-four law schools studied listed federal taxation as a required 
course). 
 144 See AICPA Memorandum, supra note 68, at 7. 
 145 See AM. BAR ASS’N, POST J.D. PROGRAMS BY CATEGORY, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/postjdprograms/postjdc.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2004) (listing 29 law schools as offering LL.M. degrees in taxation). 
 146 See, e.g., Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: 
The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35; RAPOPORT & 
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role of prominent accounting firms in promoting aggressive tax 
shelter “products,”147 suggest that accountants might benefit from 
greater exposure to the common-law anti-abuse doctrines that are 
familiar to tax lawyers,148 such as business purpose, substance over 
form, and step transactions.149  This is not to say that there are no 
accountants with expertise in the tax law, or that there are no lawyers 
who are good with numbers.  The point is that accountants working 
together with lawyers on business transactions involving significant 
tax considerations—i.e., most business transactions in the United 
States, may produce better overall advice for their clients than either 
working separately.  Delivering sound business planning advice 
requires knowledge of various tax and other laws, familiarity with 
accounting principles, and facility with numbers.  The power-washing 
owners in Verne would have had a better chance of getting an 
operating agreement tailored to their needs if Verne had been in an 
office where he consulted with an attorney in the first instance.  A 
lawyer trained in business organizations law would presumably have 
known that the operating agreement is the central document 
establishing the rights and obligations of the organization’s members.  
The articles of organization usually require only a minimal amount of 
information, and the “default rules” supplied by statutes for instances 
in which an agreement among the members is not discernible on key 
issues (such as those addressing voting and distribution rights) may 
be inappropriate for a particular entity.150  A trained practitioner 
would accordingly “tailor” the operating agreement to the parties’ 
 
DHARAN, supra note 29. 
 147 See, e.g., Ben Wang, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation 
for Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237 (2003). 
 148 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 
54 SMU L. REV. 149, 152 (2001) (observing that lawyers are, in general, more 
accustomed to analyzing anti-abuse standards than are accountants because “the 
impulse in accounting is to resolve difficulties with rules rather than standards”); see 
also Luppino, supra note 146, at 161-62 (discussing provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 that recommended a study regarding the possibility of U.S. financial 
accounting and reporting practice moving to a more “principles-based” system). 
 149 See generally Symposium, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 3 (2001); Luppino, supra note 146, at 83 n.110. 
 150 See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS, 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 30 (8th ed. 2003) (“In the 
absence of a written agreement, the relationship between the partners will be 
governed by the provisions of the applicable state partnership statute.  It is extremely 
unlikely that the provisions of this statute will reflect the expectations and 
understandings among the partners in most respects.”); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 9-11 (4th 
ed. 2003) (discussing various types and effects of “default” rules in state business 
organization statutes). 
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particular business needs and understandings. 
The plight of the clients in Verne demonstrates the benefits, and 
indeed the necessity, of an interdisciplinary approach to modern 
business planning.  The clients in Verne needed advice from an 
accountant and an attorney.  A key issue, explored throughout the 
remainder of this Article, is determining whether fully integrated 
MDPs might deliver such interdisciplinary service in a cost effective 
manner without causing more harm than good to the public. 
4. Implications of the Recent UPL Initiatives on the MDP 
Debate 
Apart from Utah’s recent activity, states with bar committees or 
other bodies working on revised practice of law definitions have in 
varying degrees attempted a balancing of interests of the type 
suggested by the ABA Task Force when it abandoned its model 
definition project.151  Nevertheless, despite the good faith efforts of a 
number of eminently qualified organizations and individuals, short of 
taking an approach along the lines of the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions, 
any practice of law definition is destined to be circular and vague, at 
least to some degree.  UPL enforcement will still require the type of 
case-by-case judgments that courts have historically had to dispense in 
carving out exceptions as customs change. 
Indiana’s recent experience with UPL reform is indicative of this 
predicament.  As the culmination of a project started well before the 
formation of the ABA Task Force, and completed approximately one 
 
 151 See Koszewski Memo, supra note 9 (reporting, among other things, that 
significant and recent practice of law definition proposals have been generated in 
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Utah and Wyoming).  According to 
Committee Chairman John Conlon, the draft definition produced by the Indiana 
Bar Association’s UPL Committee, reprinted at 47 RES GESTAE 9 (Sept. 2003) 
[hereinafter Indiana Draft Definition], was approved, with some modification, by the 
Indiana Bar Association’s House of Delegates on April 30, 2004, and has been sent to 
the Indiana Supreme Court as a recommended change to its attorney Admission and 
Discipline rules.  E-mail from John Conlon, to Anthony Luppino (May 6, 2004) (on 
file with author).  In addition, the Nebraska Court of Appeals is currently 
considering a proposed definition that was filed February 20, 2004 [hereinafter 
Nebraska Draft Definition] (copy on file with author); the Wyoming State Bar has 
proposed a practice of law definition that is currently being considered by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court [hereinafter Wyoming Draft Definition] (copy on file with 
author); a Kansas Bar Association committee, in its UPL report, see KAN. UPL COMM. 
RPT., supra note 10, has proposed that its Board of Governors recommend the 
committee’s draft definition to the Kansas Supreme Court [hereinafter Kansas Draft 
Definition] (copy on file with author); and a Massachusetts Bar Association Task 
Force circulated for comment a proposed definition of the practice of law 
[hereinafter Massachusetts Draft Definition].  MASS. UPL TASK FORCE RPT., supra 
note 10, Ex. A. 
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year after the Task Force’s circulation of its draft definition, the 
Indiana State Bar Association’s Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee in September 2003 issued its own draft definition of the 
practice of law, “with the ABA’s recommendation and balancing test 
in mind.”152  The Indiana Bar committee’s draft definition contains a 
number of helpful provisions allowing nonlawyers to undertake such 
activities as selling legal documents approved by a lawyer; 
representing others before administrative agencies in prescribed 
situations; acting as neutral mediators, arbitrators, conciliators, or 
facilitators; doing paralegal work within applicable guidelines; and 
certain other specified activities, along with “activity determined by 
[the Indiana Supreme Court] to be a permissible activity for a 
nonlawyer.”153  Many of the constituencies who protested against the 
ABA Draft Definition would find comfort in these safe harbors 
against potential UPL problems. 
The Indiana draft definition of the practice of law, however, 
evinces the same propensity for circular and vague language as the 
traditional (and widely criticized) definitions discussed above.154  Its 
“general definition” of the practice of law is, “ministering to the legal 
needs of another person for consideration given,” and gives as 
nonexclusive examples such activities as “advice on a legal right,” 
“negotiation or settlement of a legal right,” and “selection, 
preparation or completion of a legal document.”155  The chairman of 
 
 152 See John A. Conlon, Defining the Practice of Law: Can Gray Be Turned into B&W?, 
47 RES GESTAE 7 (Sept. 2003). 
 153 Indiana Draft Definition, supra note 151. 
 154 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 155 Indiana Draft Definition, supra note 151.  With respect to preparing legal 
documents, there is an exception for “selection of and/or completion of a legal 
document previously approved by a lawyer by filling in the blanks where the activity 
requires only common knowledge regarding the required information and general knowledge of 
the legal consequences.” Id. (emphasis added).  Similar general problems plague the 
definitions recently proposed in Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Wyoming.  See 
Kansas Draft Definition, supra note 151 (generally defining the practice of law as 
“ministering to the legal needs of another person and the application of legal 
principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another 
person which require knowledge of legal principles or the use of legal skill or 
knowledge,” and setting forth some non-comprehensive, broad examples of 
inclusion, along with some exceptions similar to those in the Indiana draft 
definition); Massachusetts Draft Definition, supra note 151 (generally defining the 
practice of law as the “application of legal principles and judgment with regard to 
the circumstances or objectives of a person that require the knowledge and skill of a 
person trained in the law,” and also containing broad presumptions as to inclusion in 
the practice of law similar to those in the ABA Draft Definition, but with some 
helpful exceptions, such as for certain specified types of mediation, activities in 
connection with collective bargaining rights or agreements, and pro bono service); 
Nebraska Draft Definition, supra note 151 (containing many safe harbors, including 
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the Indiana Bar Association’s UPL committee in effect reaffirmed the 
position of the ABA’s MDP Commission and the Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers156 that no single, easily 
administrable definition is achievable.  In a statement accompanying 
the publication of its draft UPL provisions, the chairman was asked 
“[whether] this proposed definition of the practice of law (and its 
exceptions) [would] turn a gray area into a black & white one?”  The 
chairman quite reasonably replied: 
No, but neither would any of the other definitions of the practice 
of law that have been recently promulgated in other states.  Many 
questions on what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law 
will always turn on the facts involved in specific matters.  
Nevertheless, the UPL Committee does believe that the proposed 
definition will address many basic questions and provide as much 
guidance to the bar and the public as is practical to give in rule 
form.157 
From this exchange, one could conclude that the states 
presumably will continue to muddle through the issue, 
understanding that there will be no perfect definition, but at least 
sensitive to the need to carve out exceptions to bans on nonlawyers 
doing work involving the law when public policy considerations 
warrant such exceptions.  Notwithstanding their inherent limitations, 
the recent and ongoing attempts at improved definitions of the 
practice of law, and UPL exceptions for certain specified service 
providers, have significant value.  Most importantly, they are causing 
participants and critics with many perspectives to reexamine what 
lawyers do, and do not do, better than nonlawyers, and to explore 
ways to make affordable legal services available to currently 
underserved segments of the public. 
Several observations can be made with respect to what the recent 
UPL initiatives add to the MDP debate.  First, these projects tell us 
that it is neither feasible nor desirable to craft a definition that 
 
some fairly generous ones that would permit certified public accountants to give tax, 
management, and financial advice that stops short of drafting legal documents 
and/or provide “legal” advice outside of those specified areas, and including broad 
references to “the application of legal principles and judgment” and “giving advice 
and counsel to another entity or person as to the legal rights of that entity or person 
or the legal rights of others for compensation, direct or indirect”); Wyoming Draft 
Definition, supra note 151 (generally defining the practice of law to include 
“providing any legal advice for any other person, firm or corporation, with or without 
compensation, or the provision of professional legal advice or services where there is 
a client relationship of trust or reliance”). 
 156 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
 157 Conlon, supra note 152, at 7. 
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completely excludes nonlawyers from providing services that have 
legal implications or involve issues of legal compliance.  Outside of 
the litigation arena, and particularly with respect to transactional 
work, it is extraordinarily difficult to definitively say which tasks do or 
do not constitute the “practice of law.”  Thus, although some 
commentators on the MDP issue have in the past suggested that 
enforcement of UPL prohibitions could by itself sufficiently regulate 
multidisciplinary practice, it has become clear that this is not the 
case.158  Second, because the legal profession purports to be 
conscientious about core values, it cannot, in good faith, ignore the 
strong statements made in opposition to broad practice of law 
definitions by those who support increasing the availability of 
affordable, law-related services to low-income consumers.  Third, 
cases such as Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Verne159 suggest that consideration 
should be given to the possibility of refining the regulatory regime to 
distinguish situations in which nonlawyers alone give advice on legal 
matters from those in which they are collaborating with licensed 
attorneys.  As explored further in Part IV, below, freeing individuals 
from the threat of UPL prosecution or other disciplinary action in 
the latter situation, where it is shown that the licensed attorney was in 
a position to protect the client’s interests through quality control 
measures, is a feasible approach.  Taken together, these observations 
suggest that permitting fully integrated MDPs, and especially those 
with an emphasis on planning and implementing business 
transactions, could provide clients with quality, affordable services 
while at the same time mitigating the fears of harm to consumers 
which presumably underlie bans on the unauthorized practice of law.  
To test that proposition, in addition to UPL rules that are being 
revisited in many jurisdictions, other rules governing the legal 
profession that stand in the way of the formation of such MDPs must 
be examined. 
B. Attorney Rules of Professional Conduct Precluding MDPs 
1. MRPC 5.4 and the ABA’s Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice 
Apart from UPL statutes, the centerpiece of the ban in the 
United States on fully integrated MDPs is MRPC 5.4, the pertinent 
substance of which is mirrored in attorney conduct rules in virtually 
 
 158 See supra notes 21, 51. 
 159 788 N.E.2d 1064 (Ohio 2003); see supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text. 
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all states.160  While other parts of the Model Rules are implicated in 
the MDP debate,161 provisions contained in Rule 5.4 speak directly to 
the ownership and control issues at the heart of the controversy.  
MRPC 5.4(a) generally precludes a lawyer from sharing legal fees 
with a nonlawyer.162  Rule 5.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from forming a 
partnership with a nonlawyer “if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law.”163  Rule 5.4(c) provides 
that a lawyer may not permit a person who recommends, employs, or 
pays the lawyer to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional 
judgment in rendering the associated legal services.164  Finally, MRPC 
5.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from practicing with or in a professional 
corporation or other association authorized to practice law for profit 
if any nonlawyer owns an equity interest therein or if any nonlawyer is 
a director or officer or holds a position of similar responsibility 
therein or otherwise has the “right to direct or control the 
professional judgment of the lawyer.”165  The obvious “core value” 
 
 160 See supra note 3.  New York’s limited deviation from MRPC 5.4, discussed infra 
notes 275-76 and accompanying text, shares the attributes of the Model Rule 
precluding fully integrated MDPs.  The District of Columbia variation examined by 
the ABA’s MDP Commission is also limited, and does not make room for the type of 
fully integrated MDP addressed herein.  See supra note 3 and infra note 274 and 
accompanying text.  
 161 For examples of the expositions of other conduct rules pertinent to the MDP 
context (such as the rules on maintaining client confidences), see Future of the 
Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (2000); 
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2. 
 162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2004). Rule 5.4(a) states: 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, 
except that: 
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or 
associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable 
period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one 
or more specified persons; 
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or 
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to 
the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon 
purchase price; 
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in 
whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and 
(4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of 
the lawyer in the matter. 
Id. 
 163 Id. R. 5.4(b). 
 164 Id. R. 5.4(c). 
 165 Id. R. 5.4(d).  Rule 5.4(d) does contain a limited exception whereby “a 
fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the 
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration.”  Id. R. 5.4(d)(1). 
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focus of these proscriptions is on the lawyer’s maintenance of 
independent professional judgment.166 
Through its references to “legal fees,” the “practice of law,” and 
“legal services,” MRPC 5.4 suffers from the definitional problems 
associated with UPL statutes.  Rule 5.4 has nonetheless stood as an 
effective impediment to the formation of fully integrated MDPs.167  
This result is not surprising, as the rule puts the burden on lawyers to 
demonstrate that they are not sharing legal fees or performing legal 
services in the prohibited settings.168  As a practical matter, their very 
status as lawyers will often make it more difficult to establish that 
their activities do not involve the practice of law than might be the 
case with “gray area” services provided by nonlawyers.169  Dean 
Burnele Powell has criticized what he describes as “gray area lawyers” 
for purporting to practice such areas as “tax,” but not “law,” in big 
accounting firms.170  As noted above, the MDP Commission on which 
Dean Powell served referred to these individuals as “vigorously 
maintaining that they are providing nonlegal consulting services,” so 
 
 166 But cf. Green, supra note 24, at 1144 (observing that Rule 5.4 may be motivated 
by the economic self-interest of lawyers as opposed to a long-standing core values 
rationale); Burnele V. Powell, Flight from the Center: Is it Just or Just About Money?, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1444-45 (2000) (noting that a substantial amount of anti-MDP 
testimony before the ABA’s MDP Commission was directed at “the economic 
implications of carving up the nation’s legal business”). 
 167 The key provisions of Rule 5.4 in the context of the MDP debate have 
remained the same since the rule was originally adopted by the ABA House of 
Delegates in 1983.  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983), with 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2004) (reflecting that the only changes 
since the adoption of the original version of Rule 5.4 have been the amendment of 
Rule 5.4(a)(2) to conform with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1990) 
regarding the sale of a law practice; the 2002 amendments adding clause (4) to Rule 
5.4(a) regarding sharing of court-awarded legal fees with non-profit organizations; 
and clarifying that the prohibitions in Rule 5.4(d)(2) apply to holders of positions in 
unincorporated law firms with similar responsibilities to the directors and officers of 
incorporated firms). 
 168 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2004). 
 169 This may explain why commentators have so sharply attacked lawyers in 
accounting firms for purporting to practice “tax” rather than law, even though 
accountants have been given substantial latitude in giving tax advice without 
widespread fear of UPL prosecution.  Compare Powell, Back to the Future, supra note 4, 
at 1384 n.40, with supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (discussing permissible 
tax practice by accountants).  See also Green, supra note 24, at 1143 (discussing the 
reasoning in several New York State Bar ethics opinions to the effect that although 
accountants could render certain tax services without violating UPL bans, a lawyer 
performing the same service would be deemed to be thereby engaged in the practice 
of law). 
 170 See Powell, Back to the Future, supra note 4, at 1384 n.40; Powell, Looking Ahead, 
supra note 19, at 111 n.50. 
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as to stay outside of the “regulatory tent.”171  Some lawyers may be 
drawing such distinctions in circumstances where the firm’s 
dominant services are perceived to be in accounting or other 
nonlegal disciplines.  In other settings, however, most lawyers would 
be either understandably reluctant to make fine points to try to avoid 
Rule 5.4 problems, or simply unwilling to give up profitable activities 
that would fall within most working definitions of the practice of law.  
It therefore makes sense that Rule 5.4 was the focal point of the 
ABA’s Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. 
Just as the charge later given to its Task Force on the Model 
Definition of the Practice of Law had some “protectionist” 
overtones,172 at least one ABA description of the mission assigned in 
1998 to its Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice can be 
characterized as territorial in its motivation.  The ABA’s Center for 
Professional Responsibility website explains that the Commission was 
“directed to study and report on the extent to which and the manner 
in which professional service firms operated by accountants and 
others who are not lawyers are seeking to provide legal advice to the 
public.”173  That language could be read to support the views of those 
who see economic protectionism as a recurring theme in the UPL 
and MDP debates.174  Fortunately, the MDP Commission instead 
appropriately followed the path enunciated by then-ABA President 
Philip Anderson, who said in August of 1998 that it had “a mandate 
to look at these issues from the standpoint of the public’s best 
interests” and “must set aside the financial interests of the profession 
and ensure that the public interest is served.”175  The very 
distinguished members of the Commission176 concluded that it was 
indeed their charge to seriously explore the possibility of MDPs 
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 173 COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABOUT THE 
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 174 See, e.g., Denckla, supra note 124; DOJ/FTC Letter, supra note 55; Fischel, supra 
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also ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 3, at 8 (“As President 
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 176 See COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicommembers.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). 
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which, with proper regulation, could provide quality services to the 
public.177  The well-chronicled work of the MDP Commission 
demonstrates that it proceeded to investigate the MDP issue with 
impressive diligence.178  Commentators and observers have praised 
the openness of the Commission’s deliberations, its helpful 
dissemination of pertinent background information, and its generally 
perceptive identification and framing of the key issues for 
examination.179 
The MDP Commission’s recommendations were, on the other 
hand, not as well-received as the process leading to those 
recommendations, and were ultimately rejected.180  The actions taken 
by the Commission and the ABA House of Delegates during the 
Commission’s approximately two-year tenure highlighted the 
tensions inherent in the MDP debate.  The Commission’s 1999 
Recommendation and Report, unanimously supported by the 
Commission members, proposed detailed modifications to MRPC 5.4 
and other aspects of the Model Rules to allow fully integrated MDPs 
owned by lawyer and nonlawyer service providers, with a special layer 
of regulation for MDPs controlled by nonlawyers.181  After careful 
study, the MDP Commission concluded, much like the Kutak 
Commission nearly two decades earlier,182 that MDPs should be 
allowed and regulated. 
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 182 For reports on the work of the Kutak Commission and the ABA’s rejection of 
that commission’s pro-MDP recommendations in the context of MRPC 5.4 debates, 
see, e.g., Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 1, at 241-43; Jones & Manning, 
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In reaching this conclusion, the MDP Commission made 
findings and observations that are directly applicable to business 
planning firms designed to serve entrepreneurs.  The Commission 
reasoned that the attorney rules of conduct should be loyal to core 
values of the legal profession, but should not “unnecessarily inhibit 
the development of new structures for the more effective delivery of 
legal services and better public access to the legal system.”183 After 
analyzing approximately sixty hours of testimony and voluminous 
written materials gathered from a number of sources, including 
“small business clients,” the Commission found “that there is an 
interest by clients in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver 
legal services as part of a multidisciplinary practice (MDP).”184  It 
determined that, with appropriate safeguards, this client interest 
could be satisfied in a fully integrated MDP without compromising 
core values “that are essential for the protection of clients and the 
proper maintenance of the client-lawyer relationship.”185  The 
Commission also observed that despite the fact that much of the 
MDP debate focuses on large accounting firms and large law firms, 
“there is a substantial interest in forming MDPs by lawyers in solo and 
small firm practices.”186  This is a particularly important point, given 
that American Bar Foundation statistics indicate that, despite the 
modern proliferation of large law firms, nearly seventy percent of the 
attorneys in private practice in the United States are sole 
practitioners or practice in firms of ten or fewer attorneys.187 
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En route to its 1999 recommendation to allow, but regulate, fully 
integrated MDPs, the Commission explored the history of MRPC 5.4.  
It noted that the rule’s proscriptions were not included in the ABA’s 
original Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, but rather entered the 
Canons some twenty years later, in precatory language that did not 
become mandatory rules of conduct until the ABA’s adoption of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1969.188  The Reporters Notes 
to the 1999 Report and Recommendation cited the view of the Kutak 
Commission that the prohibitions in MRPC 5.4 were only “tenuously 
related” to substantial ethical concerns about relationships between 
lawyers and nonlawyers.189  Other observers who have studied the 
evolution of MRPC 5.4 have similarly noted its lack of a compelling 
basis, from a client-protection perspective, for its bans on fee-sharing 
and partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers.190  Nevertheless, 
the MDP Commission did not advocate repeal of Rule 5.4.  Instead, it 
recommended modification of its prohibitions in a manner that 
would allow partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers by 
preserving the ethical responsibilities of lawyer participants.191 
The key terms of the Commission’s 1999 Recommendation 
included a requirement that a multidisciplinary practice comprised 
of lawyers and nonlawyers have “as one, but not all” of its purposes, or 
that it hold out to the public, that it will provide legal services, as well 
as nonlegal services, to clients.192  The Commission also 
recommended that MDPs—in connection with the delivery of legal 
services—be subject to the same conflict of interest, imputation, and 
other ethical rules as those that apply to law firms.193  Other 
recommendations included a ban on the delivery of legal services by 
nonlawyers in the MDP (accompanied by statements making it clear 
that its recommendation is not intended to override UPL rules);194 a 
provision that a lawyer in an MDP is not excused from observing the 
rules of professional conduct by reason of a “nonlawyer supervisor’s 
resolution of a question of professional duty”;195 a requirement that 
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lawyers in the MDP alert clients to the potentially varying obligations 
of lawyers and nonlawyers in the firm with respect to confidential 
information and potential effects on attorney–client privilege;196 a 
continued prohibition on the holding of equity interests in the MDP 
by persons other than the lawyer and nonlawyer service providers;197 
and a system of court-supervised oversight and audits of MDPs 
controlled by nonlawyers.198  The accompanying Report and 
Reporter’s Notes leave little doubt that the Commission’s 1999 
Recommendation was based on principled study and analysis, and a 
balancing of interests loyal to the direction provided by ABA 
President Anderson.199 
The Commission’s progress over twelve months was apparently 
too much, too fast, for some elements of the legal profession.  Under 
pressure from various bar associations, the Commission requested 
that the ABA House of Delegates defer voting on the 1999 
Recommendation.200  That request was in effect granted, when the 
House of Delegates adopted a resolution indicating that there would 
be no changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to permit 
MDPs, “unless and until additional study demonstrates that such 
changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or 
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession’s 
tradition of loyalty to clients.”201 
The MDP Commission thereafter undertook substantial further 
study, in consultation with various bar associations and other 
representatives of the legal profession.  It acknowledged and 
addressed criticism of various aspects of its proposed regulatory 
system for MDPs, and published an item-by-item response on 
significant issues in question.202  At the outset of that presentation, the 
Commission addressed its failure to cite “competence” as a core value 
in its 1999 Recommendation, in which it had followed the lead of 
MDP opponents in focusing on the core values of loyalty, 
confidentiality, and independence of judgment.203  In response, the 
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Commission simply explained that it had not intended to “denigrate 
the importance of competence,” and had assumed it was “implicit” in 
its Recommendation, and should be listed in any future 
recommendation and report.  The Commission thus regrettably 
missed an opportunity to more fully discuss the prominent role 
competence should play in the MDP debate.  Taking into account the 
complex, interdisciplinary nature of modern practice, and 
particularly modern transactional work, a strong argument can be 
made that multidisciplinary practice may be necessary to avoid 
incompetence.204  The example of Brad’s Transplex start-up venture set 
forth in Part II, above, demonstrates the need for a coordinated team 
of individuals, consisting of both lawyers and nonlawyers.  The mix of 
issues likely involved in the Transplex project implicates not only 
several areas of law (such as, among others, business organizations, 
securities regulation, tax, intellectual property, zoning, 
environmental regulation, and employment law), but also reveals a 
need for expertise in many other areas, including accounting, 
insurance, marketing, mechanical engineering, and systems 
management.205  One way or another, a lawyer attempting to 
“quarterback” the Transplex project would need to assemble and 
coordinate the efforts of a team of specialists. 
An attorney may in fact be required to enlist the services of 
specialists when the need to address issues outside of his or her 
expertise would prevent the attorney from efficiently and 
competently serving all of the client’s interests.206  The existence of 
this expertise problem is corroborated by the MDP Commission’s fact 
gathering, in which, as noted above, it uncovered a strong interest in 
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MDPs among lawyers practicing in solo and small law firms.207  In 
dealing with the complexities of many business transactions, lawyers 
may often be required to engage in some form of multidisciplinary 
practice, a point that should not be overlooked in discussions of the 
alternatives available to attorneys in fulfilling their competency 
obligation. 
Following its unfortunately abbreviated discussion of 
competence as a core value, the MDP Commission turned to a 
frequent claim made by MDP opponents—an alleged lack of 
“empirical evidence” that the public needs MDPs.  Its response to that 
claim was threefold.  First, it argued that no useful method would 
exist to definitively establish the need for MDPs until they had been 
allowed to operate and become market-tested.208  Second, it pointed 
to testimony and materials supporting the conclusion that a need 
existed.209  Third, in an effort to use MDP opponents’ fear of the then 
“Big Five” accounting firms’ aggressive tactics against them, the 
Commission suggested that the accounting giants’ success in 
recruiting and marketing the services of lawyers (who may be walking 
a fine line in terms of UPL issues) is in fact empirical evidence of a 
market for MDPs.210  Again, the Commission could have said more.  
In this instance, it might have invoked the “common sense” that the 
ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law 
would later recommend to states considering UPL reforms.211  It is 
not difficult to intuit, for example, that an entrepreneur trying to 
start a business under temporal and financial constraints could 
benefit from a “one-stop shop.”  Fees for such a firm’s services would 
reflect the overhead of one firm rather than several, communications 
among the key service providers would be streamlined, and, as 
discussed further in Part IV below, the owners of the firm would 
share the risk-based concern that all services be performed 
competently and to the client’s satisfaction.  In addition, one might 
argue that if fully integrated MDPs are unnecessary, they will not 
survive, and the list of core value disasters cited by MDP opponents 
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would never materialize.  In short, for a variety of reasons, the 
argument that fully integrated MDPs should be prohibited until a 
need for them is empirically demonstrated fails the test of common 
sense. 
After its additional year of study, and taking into account the 
criticisms of its 1999 Recommendation, the MDP Commission 
returned to the ABA House of Delegates with what has been 
characterized as a “compromise” proposal.212  The 2000 
Recommendation was shorter and less specific than its 1999 
predecessor, leaving many details of the mechanics of regulation to 
the states.213  The most significant substantive difference between the 
Commission’s 1999 and 2000 Recommendations was that the latter 
limited its recommendation to permit MDPs to arrangements in 
which “the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure 
lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services.”214  The 2000 
Recommendation and Report does not provide a precise definition 
of “control and authority.”  Instead of a “majority ownership” or 
similar test, it favors a facts and circumstances approach that might 
be more easily adaptable to the varied particulars of different sized 
firms or disparate types of multidisciplinary arrangements.215 
Unlike its 1999 proposal, the Commission’s 2000 Report 
indicates that its 2000 Recommendation was not unanimously 
supported, at least with respect to a few major features.  The 2000 
Report states that some members would have included a specific 
requirement of majority ownership by lawyers (with a state-by-state 
option to require supermajority ownership), and would require that a 
“primary purpose” of the MDP be the delivery of legal services.216  
Such apparent disagreements among Commission members could, in 
any event, be resolved at the individual state level.  Although it was a 
watered down version of its 1999 Recommendation, the 2000 
proposal retained the central conclusion that the legal profession 
needed to respond to various forces of change,217 and that permitting 
MDPs should be a part of that response.  Criticism of the 1999 
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Recommendation was directed primarily at perceived threats to the 
core value of “professional independence” if lawyers were directed by 
nonlawyers.  The 2000 Recommendation attempted to address this 
criticism by including a condition of lawyer “control and authority” of 
the type which the Commission had previously rejected.218 
The compromise was not enough.  In a lopsided vote at its July 
2000 meeting, the ABA House of Delegates instead adopted 
Resolution 10F, which had been offered by several state and local bar 
associations and included, among other things, a clear statement that 
“[t]he law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal 
fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly transferring to 
nonlawyers ownership or control over entities practicing law, should 
not be revised.”219  The Resolution also called for the refinement of 
state definitions of the practice of law and for enforcement of UPL 
bans.220  Other provisions were consistent with the message that MDPs 
were not to be legitimized.221  Beyond that, states were encouraged to 
discipline lawyers practicing in de facto MDPs, and to prosecute more 
vigorously UPL violations through Resolution provisions that may 
have been aimed, at least in part, at facilitating states’ prosecution of 
the Big Five accounting firms.222  Finally, the Resolution dismissed the 
MDP Commission “with gratitude for its hard work” and 
“commendation for its substantial contributions to the profession.”223 
A number of commentators sharply attacked the action taken by 
the House of Delegates in July of 2000.  Many argued that the “core 
values” rationale was greatly exaggerated, and was an insufficient 
basis for depriving the public of the option to pursue the potential 
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benefits of MDPs.224  Several commentators asserted that invocation of 
core values was thin camouflage for economic protectionism.225  
Regardless of motive, the record of the MDP Commission’s work, the 
criticism of its recommendations from various quarters, and the text 
of Resolution 10F all suggest that the single biggest obstacle to fully 
integrated MDPs is the fear of compromising the core value of 
professional independence, intertwined with the separately stated 
core value of loyalty through the avoidance of conflicts of interest.226  
There are certainly issues to address in other areas as well, such as 
confidentiality and attorney–client privilege.  Still, the central area of 
debate has been over the extent to which the presence of nonlawyer 
owners might pressure lawyers in an MDP to compromise their 
professional independence in delivering legal services.227  The next 
section explores that pivotal issue. 
2. A Hard Look at Pressures on Professional 
Independence 
MDP opponents seem convinced that nonlawyers in MDP 
settings, and accountants in particular, would force lawyers to 
sacrifice their professional independence for the sake of the bottom 
line.228  The implication is that lawyers are more principled, and less 
interested in profit, than accountants or other service providers.229  
The anti-MDP literature is not at all clear on exactly how dismissal of 
the lawyer’s ethical obligations at the behest of money-grubbing 
nonlawyer partners would uniquely manifest itself in fully integrated 
MDPs.  The MDP Commission explicitly raised the issue of the 
“selective” nature of the MDP opponents’ arguments in this key area, 
citing some common examples of lawyers having to deal with threats 
to their independent judgment in other practice environments.230  
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Accordingly, as other MDP commentators have appropriately 
observed,231 it is useful to consider in more detail some of the 
pressures affecting a lawyer’s decision-making in a typical American 
law firm—a business organization that shares at least one 
characteristic with both accounting firms and many envisioned MDPs: 
it is decidedly for profit.232 
Associate attorneys and junior partners in law firms are 
frequently under pressure from senior law firm partners to produce 
billable and collectible hours.233  They are also encouraged to 
originate new business.  Even senior partners in a law firm are judged 
in terms of some combination of billable work and “rainmaking.”234  
 
issues are frequently resolved by a managing partner or an executive committee and 
in which compensation is dependent on billings.”).  Even without citing the many 
additional examples discussed below, the MDP Commission saw enough undue 
selectivity in this line of reasoning by MDP opponents to cause it to expressly solicit 
comments “on whether it should suggest that a separate rule addressing professional 
independence be adopted to apply to all lawyers in all practice settings regardless of 
the manner in which they are compensated.”  Id. 
 231 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 190, at 602 (“[T]here is no reason to suppose that 
corporations or laymen engage in the ‘sordid’ business of making money any more 
than do traditional law firms.”); James W. Jones, Focusing the MDP Debate: Historical 
and Practical Perspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 996 (1999) (arguing that the core 
value issues cited by MDP opponents, including professional independence, “are all 
issues that arise in the ordinary practice of law, particularly in large, multi-office or 
international firms”); Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1199-1201 (“Indeed, in an 
era of large and rapidly growing law firms with the attendant economic pressures 
they create, the focus on threats to a lawyer’s independence ‘from within’ would 
seem equally important to threats ‘from without.’”); Poser, supra note 1, at 123-24 
(“A better way to consider the issue of independent judgment is to recognize the 
threats to its existence in traditional firms.  Private law firms are for-profit businesses 
and the pressures this creates are substantial.”); Swan, supra note 4, at 402 (citing the 
report of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on Multidisciplinary 
Practice, infra note 277, for the proposition that there is no “evidence that in a 
multidisciplinary practice the business pressures qualitatively diverge from those in a 
modern law firm (or the legal department of a business organization)”); see also 
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 139 (asserting that there is no evidence that 
lawyers working for government agencies, as corporate in-house counsel, or for trade 
associations or other nonprofit organizations compromise their independent 
judgment to a greater extent than lawyers practicing in law firms). 
 232 See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 159 (Cal. 1993) (“[C]ontemporary 
changes in the legal profession . . . make the assertion that the practice of law is not 
comparable to a business unpersuasive and unreflective of reality.”); CAL. MDP RPT., 
supra note 2, at 13 (citing Howard v. Babcock as an example of the recognition that 
“the ‘special’ role of lawyers does not immunize them from the realities and 
economics of the professional market place”). 
 233 See generally HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 150, at 41-57 (discussing law firm 
compensation factors, and noting the importance of billable hours and origination 
of new business, and the popularity of “sweat bonuses” for billable hours that exceed 
a specified threshold amount). 
 234 See id. at 50 n.9, 54 n.1. 
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While compensation structures may vary from firm to firm, with some 
giving more credit for pro bono work, firm management service, or 
other non-billable time, it would be a rare law firm that did not place 
primary emphasis on lawyer time and originations billed and 
collected.235 
A lawyer who is not careful, honest, and principled in these 
circumstances might succumb to various temptations, such as cutting 
corners on the completion of transactional work on a project being 
billed as a flat fee rather than on an hourly rate basis; logging more 
hours than appropriate on a matter;236 proposing premature 
settlement of a case taken on a contingency fee; curtailing research in 
the face of a risk that a client might balk at (and refuse to pay) the 
bill for the additional research needed to allow full analysis of an 
issue; straining to find no conflict of interest in accepting new 
engagements from parties with some interests adverse to existing 
clients;237 or ignoring evidence of possible wrongdoing by an 
important client or a senior partner.238  These are just a few examples 
in the context of lawyers working for lawyers.  If there were no 
legitimate fear that senior attorneys might, intentionally or not, 
pressure attorneys working for them to make wrong decisions, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct would not need to include 
special provisions regarding a “subordinate” lawyer’s reliance on a 
supervising attorney’s “reasonable resolution of an arguable question 
of professional duty.”239 
Lawyers working in law firms may feel pressures from sources 
outside the firm as well.  The primary danger is that clients might 
want to engage in illegal or improper activity, with the direct 
participation or passive acquiescence of the attorney.  Less 
 
 235 See id. at 41-57. 
 236 See, e.g., Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1198 (noting pressure to “keep the 
billable hours up”); Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to 
Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 916 
(2002) (positing in her oft-cited commentary on billing fraud in law firms that 
“[r]ewarding people for billing huge numbers of hours, or for bringing in work that 
leads others to bill huge numbers of hours, is tacit institutional encouragement to 
write down phony hours”); Poser, supra note 1, at 124. 
 237 Cf. ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND RPT., supra note 5, at 6. 
 238 Id. 
 239 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2004); see also ABA MDP COMM’N 
2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND RPT., supra note 5, at 6.  Similarly, the “up-the-ladder” 
reporting rules recently promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
might not have included special relief for subordinate attorneys from follow-up 
obligations on reports of evidence of material violations of law.  See Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing before the 
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2004). 
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egregiously, perhaps, the client might, attempting to facilitate the 
closing of a business transaction, prod the attorney to give an 
opinion, or to take a position on compliance with a regulation or in a 
legal proceeding, with which the lawyer is not comfortable.240  These 
are only a few examples of potential conflict between a client’s 
desires and a lawyer’s professional judgment.  The economic pressure 
may be significant, especially if the client accounts for a large 
percentage of the firm’s or lawyer’s income.241 
Business lawyers may face additional complications if 
transactional clients offer them a “piece of the deal” in lieu of a cash 
fee, in gratitude for the lawyer’s work, or just because the client needs 
investors.242  The potential for conflicts of interest that might 
compromise professional judgment in matters pertaining to that 
business is obvious.  Interpreting the requirements of various aspects 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has issued a 
Formal Opinion condoning such investment where the terms are fair 
and reasonable, appropriate disclosures are made, the client is given 
the opportunity to be advised by independent legal counsel 
regarding such investment, the lawyer concludes that independent 
professional judgment can be maintained, and the client consents.243  
Commentators have questioned the extent to which lawyers 
representing companies in which they hold an equity interest can 
indeed maintain professional independence, particularly in such 
matters as disclosures in a securities regulation context.244 ABA 
 
 240 Cf. Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1199 (noting possible pressures by senior 
partners on young associates to reach a result in an opinion or memorandum “that is 
more likely to the liking of a large client of the law firm”). 
 241 See ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND RPT., supra note 5, at 9 
(noting that, even apart from multidisciplinary settings, where a law firm depends on 
one client for “a substantial portion of its revenues,” resulting “[f]ear of antagonizing 
the client may interfere with the exercise of independent professional judgment by 
the firm’s lawyers”). 
 242 See, e.g., Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1198-99; Poser, supra note 1, at 124 
(noting that contingency fees and acquisition of an interest in a client’s business 
pose risks to independent judgment). 
 243 ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 418 (2000) 
(applying, principally, the rules and considerations reflected in MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (Fees), R. 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule), R. 1.8 
(Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions), and R. 2.1 (Advisor)). 
 244 See, e.g., Royce De R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm 
Investments in Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 379 (2002); Christine 
Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in 
a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out,” Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (2003).  But 
cf. Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their Corporate Clients’ 
Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569 (2002); Puri, supra note 47 (acknowledging the existence 
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Formal Opinion 418 apparently viewed the threat to professional 
independence as outweighed by other concerns.  It indicated, for 
instance, that part of the rationale for allowing these arrangements is 
to assist start-up businesses that may have little cash at the outset to 
pay legal fees.245  This is more than a bit ironic, in that at 
approximately the same time Opinion 418 was issued, the ABA House 
of Delegates adopted Resolution 10F, grounding its argument for 
continued prohibition of fully integrated MDPs (despite testimony 
suggesting that such MDPs could deliver more cost-effective services 
to small start-up businesses) largely on perceived threats to a lawyer’s 
professional independence.246 
A lawyer working in a law firm might also be compromised by 
nonlawyers outside of the firm providing services to the law firm’s 
clients—in other words, the same individuals with whom lawyers 
might “partner” in fully integrated MDPs, if they were allowed.  A 
client’s accountant, financial planner, or business consultant may 
very well be in a position to influence the client to give more work to 
the lawyer or to direct the client’s legal work to a different law firm.  
At the same time, the accountant or other nonlawyer service provider 
could be a referral source with respect to prospective law firm clients, 
and might expect referrals in return.  The firm lawyer may therefore 
experience some pressure to get along with those nonlawyers, 
perhaps by recommending them to their clients even if the quality of 
their work is questionable.247 
One of the reasons that the legal profession lays claim to high 
ethical standards—lawyer jokes notwithstanding—is that lawyers are 
trained to identify and resist these various temptations and pressures.  
It is a matter of individual integrity.  The ABA MDP Commission and 
numerous commentators have noted that the focus of the disciplinary 
rules for professional conduct has traditionally been on the individual 
 
of potential conflicts, but concluding that such arrangements should be thoughtfully 
regulated, rather than banned). 
 245 ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 418, at 1 (2000) 
(“From the client’s perspective, the lawyer’s willingness to invest with entrepreneurs 
in the start-up company frequently is viewed as a vote of confidence in the 
enterprise’s prospects.  Moreover, a lawyer’s willingness to accept stock instead of a 
cash fee may be the only way for a cash-poor client to obtain competent legal 
counsel.”). 
 246 Formal Opinion 418 was issued July 7, 2000.  Id.  Resolution 10F was adopted 
July 11, 2000.  See Gibeaut, supra note 8. 
 247 Cf. Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1199 (properly observing that, 
independent of nonlawyers, similar conflicts threaten a lawyer’s judgment when 
pressured to refer work to another lawyer in the same law firm, even if that lawyer is 
not necessarily the “best” person to handle the client matter in question). 
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lawyer.248  MDP opponents have failed to explain, at least to any 
meaningful extent, why there would be a significant impairment of a 
lawyer’s ability to maintain independent professional judgment 
under pressures in the MDP context as compared with those already 
present in law firm practice.249  The affected decisions in terms of the 
delivery of legal services would presumably be the same, and in both 
cases there could be adverse financial consequences from disagreeing 
with those exerting the pressure.  Surely MDP opponents, who seem 
to be quite confident in the abilities of lawyers generally, cannot be 
presuming that accountants in the MDP will argue more persuasively 
than senior law firm partners.  Perhaps the assumption of MDP 
opponents is that, on average, the senior lawyers are expected to be 
more principled watchdogs and buffers between junior lawyers and 
outside forces than would be senior accountants or other nonlawyer 
proprietors of MDPs.  This reasoning will be addressed below, along 
with descriptions of possible safeguards in the context of a business 
planning MDP that would be designed to ensure that all of the 
owner/service providers have incentives to make the right decisions 
on matters of professional judgment and duty.250 
 
 248 See, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RPT., supra note 93, at 2; Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 2, at 203; Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1209; see also Mary C. 
Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for 
Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 261 (2003); Lalli, supra note 17, at 300-01; David Luban, 
Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (2003); Burnele V. Powell, The 
Limits of Integrity or Why Cabinets Have Locks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 311 (2003); Deborah 
L. Rhode, If Integrity Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333 
(2003). 
 249 Cf. Alwin & Eckerly, supra note 6, at 264 (“[MDP opponents] offer no 
empirical support for the theory that lawyers will succumb to the pressures of 
nonlawyer management.”); Green, supra note 24, at 1154-55 (arguing that the 
assumption that lawyers would be “too weak to withstand the influence of their 
nonlawyer collaborators” is both “unwarranted” and  “at odds with the most 
fundamental assumption of lawyer professionalism and self-regulation”); Poser, supra 
note 1, at 125 (similarly arguing that if we assume under current ethical rules that 
lawyers can maintain their independence and look out for the best interests of their 
clients, “there is little reason to think that lawyers will buckle under pressure exerted 
by nonlawyer colleagues”).  See also Letter from Professor Robert W. Gordon, to the 
American Bar Association MDP Commission (May 21, 1999), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gordon.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) (urging the 
Commission to ask whether multidisciplinary practices would “add” significant new 
pressures, and whether benefits of MDPs might outweigh the probable costs or risks 
of added pressures). 
 250 See infra notes 261-72 and accompanying text (discussing the suggestion by 
MDP opponents that lawyers are inherently more principled than accountants); infra 
Part IV.B (proposing a model system of safeguards for a business planning MDP). 
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3. Looking Beyond Matters of Form Regarding 
Independence and Confidentiality 
As discussed in the previous section, under currently permitted 
multidisciplinary collaborations, accountants and other nonlawyers 
who are part of a team representing common clients may threaten a 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment.  To assume that 
partnering such nonlawyer service providers with the lawyer and his 
or her law partners will make those pressures significantly worse is 
elevating form over substance.251  In fact, a better argument can be 
made that by directly sharing the risk of adverse consequences from 
breach of the lawyer’s professional duties, the nonlawyer business 
partners would be less likely to try to influence the lawyer to commit 
such breaches.252 
Similar form over substance reasoning occurs in arguments over 
confidentiality and attorney–client privilege, another “core values” 
concern commonly expressed by MDP opponents.253  In a business 
planning project, for instance, a team of individuals will be called 
upon to review plans, as illustrated by the Transplex example in Part 
II, above.254  There will be frequent discussions among the client, the 
lawyers, and the nonlawyers on the team, which may very well involve 
proprietary or other information that the client would like to keep 
confidential.  The extent to which preserving confidentiality of client 
information is in the best interest of the public is, however, 
debatable.255  In addition, amidst allegations of major corporate 
 
 251 Cf. Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1200 (“The broad proscriptive provisions 
of Rule 5.4 represent a glorification of form over substance that cannot be justified 
on the basis of preserving the professional independence of lawyers.”); Terry, A 
Primer on MDPs, supra note 7, at 923 (“Rather than using rules about legal forms as a 
proxy for our true concerns, U.S. regulators should focus on the underlying issues.”). 
 252 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 253 See, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RPT., supra note 93, at 3 (summarizing 
concerns expressed in these areas); Jones & Manning, supra note 6, at 1194-95, 1202-
03 (noting that the Kutak Commission had pointed to existing disciplinary rules as 
adequate protection of confidentiality, regardless of the form of practice and seeing 
“no reason” to differentiate between an MDP and a law firm with respect to 
confidential client information); Michael W. Price, Comment, A New Millenium’s 
Resolution: The ABA Continues Its Regrettable Ban on Multidisciplinary Practice, 37 
HOUSTON L. REV. 1495, 1518-19 (2000) (similarly observing that confidentiality and 
privilege issues are complicated by interactions with nonlawyers in many existing 
practice settings, and that current rules should be adaptable to MDPs, perhaps via 
clarifying amendment). 
 254 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
 255 See, e.g., Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney–Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 477 (2002) (discussing the history of attorney–client confidentiality 
and privilege in the United States, and highlighting the difficult balancing of 
interests that merits continued questioning of the limits of the breadth of these 
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financial fraud, there has been a controversy of particular interest in 
the business transactions arena.256  In fact, both the Securities and 
Exchange Commission257 and the ABA258 have recently taken action 
aimed at expanding the range of “permissive disclosure” by attorneys 
of clients’ financial wrongdoing. 
Whatever the limits of confidentiality and privilege may evolve to 
be, the associated duties should remain on individual attorneys.  
Disclosure of MDP client information to nonlawyers should raise the 
same confidentiality and privilege issues for lawyers in MDPs as 
currently exist in law firms or in collaborations with persons outside 
 
concepts); see also Crystal, supra note 12, at 757-58 (arguing that historical analysis 
does not support “strict confidentiality, noting, for example, that the ABA’s 1908 
Canons required disclosure of unrectified fraud in various circumstances”).  But cf. 
Lawrence J. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277 
(2002) (urging strenuous resistance to proposals contained in a preliminary report 
of the ABA’s Task Force on Corporate Responsibility to facilitate permissive 
disclosure, and in some cases require disclosure of corporate fraud, characterizing 
confidentiality as “the second leg of the tripod of core values that support our 
professional ethic,” and arguing that the proposals in question would make it more 
difficult for lawyers to represent their clients). 
 256 See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships 
in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1249 (2000) (arguing that strict 
duties of confidentiality and attorney–client privilege “make transactional lawyers less 
effective as reputational intermediaries and therefore harm their honest clients”); 
Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in Justifying Some 
Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49  (2001) 
(discussing the role of confidentiality rhetoric in facilitating corporate fraud); 
Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84  
MINN L. REV. 1399  (2000) (exploring the underlying motivations for concealment of 
information by lawyers and others, with particular focus on audited companies and 
the differing duties of lawyers and auditors, and suggesting in the MDP context that 
waiver of confidentiality by a sophisticated business client may be of benefit to both 
the public and the client); Recommendation of ABA Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility to Modify MRPC Rule 1.6, as adopted by resolution of ABA House of 
Delegates August 11-12, 2003, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/119a.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 
2004) (explaining reasons for expansion of the “Ethics 2000” amendments to add 
information regarding financial crimes or frauds to  Rule 1.6’s short list of permitted 
disclosures of confidential client information). 
 257 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2004) (authorizing attorneys representing an 
“issuer”—generally a public company filing reports under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934—to disclose to Securities and Exchange Commission, without issuer’s 
consent, confidential information to the extent that attorney reasonably believes 
necessary to prevent perjury, fraud on Commission, material violation of law likely to 
cause substantial financial injury to issuer or investors, or to rectify consequences of 
such material violation in which attorney’s services were used). 
 258 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004); see also Painter, supra note 29, 
at 186-87 (arguing that failure of the ABA to modify MRPC 1.6 to permit disclosures 
of ongoing or prospective client crime or fraud would put into public question the 
propriety of the legal profession’s “core values” with respect to confidentiality). 
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of law firms.  To safeguard the attorney’s duties and the client’s 
understanding of the issues involved, the types of disclosures and 
warnings about differing duties with respect to confidential 
information and possible effects on attorney–client privilege 
suggested by the MDP Commission in its 1999 Recommendation for 
the operation of fully integrated MDPs,259 should be given in both the 
MDP context and in situations where the collaborating service 
providers are not owners of the same firm.  Although access to files 
and electronic data may present some additional challenges in 
protecting attorney–client communications in a fully integrated 
MDP,260 those mechanical issues can be addressed by appropriate 
procedures which should be well within the capabilities of lawyers to 
design and monitor. 
When substance is placed ahead of form, it becomes clear that 
diligence by individual attorneys is what ultimately makes the ethics 
rules work and drives the delivery of quality legal services to clients.  
Business lawyers are accustomed to advising clients on how to 
structure their business organizations to limit incentives for 
malfeasance by co-owners or employees and to protect proprietary 
information.  As will be described in Part IV below, diligent lawyers 
should be capable of building into firms—including firms in which 
they hold ownership interests along with nonlawyers—a system of 
checks and balances to ensure compliance with the substance of their 
individually-based ethical rules, regardless of the form of the business 
arrangement. 
4.  Sears, Tow-Truck Drivers, Nest Foulers, and the Fear of 
a Circus 
It has been reported that the Kutak Commission’s efforts to have 
MRPC 5.4 modified to permit MDPs suffered a fatal blow in 1983 
when a supporter of those efforts answered “yes” when asked if, 
 
 259 ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, at 1; ABA MDP 
COMM’N 1999 RPT., supra note 93, at 3.  But cf. Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: 
The Effects of Attorney–Accountant Multidisciplinary Practice on the Protections of the 
Attorney–Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33 (2001) (arguing that multidisciplinary 
practice has the potential to erode confidentiality and attorney–client privilege 
despite the safeguards suggested by the MDP Commission, and that jurisdictions that 
take action to allow multidisciplinary practice should also consider enacting 
testimonial accountant–client privilege statutes). 
 260 See Michael Traynor, Some Open Questions About Attorney–Client Privilege and Work 
Product in a Multidisciplinary Practice, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 43, 47 (2001) (raising 
questions about storage of confidential information and work product and asserting 
that it may be “no easy task” for MDPs to develop and maintain adequate 
safeguards). 
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under the pending proposal, Sears could own a law firm.261  Some 
commentators have explained that the ABA House of Delegates’ 
rejection of the Kutak Commission’s recommendation was based on 
purported threats to professional independence, concern that 
lawyers would not be able to be “professional,” and the fear of a 
“fundamental but unknown effect on the legal profession” if Sears, or 
other large retailing, tax preparation, or accounting firms, owned 
organizations that employed lawyers and dispensed legal advice.262  
Similarly, the MDP Commission’s 1999-2000 work was tainted by 
allusions to lawyers in partnership with the likes of tow-truck 
drivers.263  The rhetoric advanced by MDP opponents has been an 
interesting blend of sky-is-falling predictions that lawyers will lose the 
ability to maintain their integrity when associated with nonlawyers, 
and rather elitist pronouncements about the “legal profession.” 
While other professions and trades have been included in MDP 
opponents’ lists of allegedly horrible prospective nonlawyer partners, 
a special place has clearly been reserved for accountants.  One of the 
most oft-cited works in the MDP debate is Lawrence Fox’s article, 
Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and 
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs.264  Recently 
fueled by major deficiencies in audits of Enron and other large 
publicly held companies,265 the assaults on the “accounting 
profession” make unfounded generalizations about accountants, 
again focusing inordinately on the handful of “Big” auditing firms.  
For example, referring to Arthur Andersen’s audit failure in the case 
of Enron as “vindication” of the arguments of MDP opponents, Fox 
questions the ability of lawyers to “succeed in an MDP environment 
when the accountants so dramatically failed.”266 Such a blanket 
conclusion is unsupported by facts, especially since the problems and 
failures of accounting giants like Arthur Andersen are not analogous 
to and will not threaten the potential success of smaller firms and 
 
 261 See Levinson, supra note 8, at 140. 
 262 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 190, at 594-95; Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely, 
supra note 1, at 242 (recounting the Kutak Commission’s experience and fear that 
Sears, Montgomery Ward, H & R Block, and the “Big” accounting firms would end 
up competing with law firms). 
 263 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 198-200 (citing and discussing oral 
testimony before the MDP Commission raising this prospect, as well as the prospect 
of partnerships with undertakers, beauticians, and other tradespersons who, from the 
perspective of those offering the testimony, might be seen as demeaning the legal 
profession). 
 264 Fox, Accountants, supra note 30. 
 265 See generally RAPOPORT & DHARAN, supra note 29. 
 266 Fox, MDPs Done Gone, supra note 26, at 547, 555. 
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their clients.  These attacks on the accounting profession also ignore 
the reality that certified public accountants have strict codes of 
professional conduct.267  It is certainly true that recent shortcomings 
of some “Big Five” auditors have revealed the need for revamped 
systems of regulation of the audit function and for consideration of 
the promulgation of accounting principles.268 Similarly, aggressiveness 
by the major accounting firms in promoting tax shelter “products” 
has inspired enhanced disclosure requirements and governmental 
scrutiny of tax shelters.269  Even so, it is simply unfair and hypocritical 
to condemn the accounting profession as a whole for the problems 
which made those measures necessary. 
Reflecting on the treatment of accounting and other professions 
in the anti-MDP literature, one would think Shakespeare had written, 
“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the nonlawyers.”270  MDP opponents 
imply that partnerships between individuals from various professions 
would turn the delivery of legal services into something of a circus, 
which would be inattentive to “core values” that only lawyers can truly 
understand.  Public opinion polls notwithstanding,271 the legal 
profession is indeed a noble one, and conscientious attorneys should 
be proud to be part of a tradition of important contributions to the 
administration of civilized society.272  To become licensed attorneys, 
these individuals have undertaken intense study and have been 
carefully trained in the nuances of a formal set of ethical rules.  
 
 267 The AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct, which includes provisions on 
integrity, objectivity, conflicts of interest (under Rule 102), and confidential client 
information (under Rule 301) can be accessed at 
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/comp.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).  See also 
Alwin & Eckerly, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that CPA examination has section that 
includes business law and professional responsibility). 
 268 For discussion of this author’s view of the historical background and an 
overview of recent Congressional and SEC responses to major public company 
auditing failures by large accounting firms, see Luppino, supra note 146. 
 269 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (2004); Wang, supra note 147. 
 270 The actual line, from WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY 
THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2, is, “First thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,” and is often 
quoted, misleadingly out of context, as if it were a lawyer joke. 
 271 See Rhode, supra note 248, at 333 n.2 (noting that lawyers “barely edge out 
used car salesmen” in public opinion polls on rankings for honesty). 
 272 Indeed, Shakespeare’s line, quoted supra note 270, actually speaks to the 
importance of lawyers in warding off tyranny.  Compare the noble role of lawyers as 
stewards of the law, as suggested by President Kennedy’s statement, “Law is the 
adhesive force in the cement of society, creating order out of chaos and coherence in 
place of anarchy.”  President John F. Kennedy, Address at Ninetieth Anniversary 
Convocation of Vanderbilt University (May 18, 1963), quotation available at, John F. 
Kennedy Quote Page, http://home.att.net/~jrhsc/jfk.html. (last visited Oct. 21, 
2004). 
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Although lawyers are sometimes criticized and ridiculed because they 
are often messengers of bad news—such as when business lawyers 
have to tell a group of hard-charging entrepreneurs about a series of 
regulatory impediments that they must overcome before they can 
realize their dream—astute clients recognize that good lawyers 
facilitate their compliance with complex rules and regulations in 
achieving their goals, and are an important part of their team of 
advisors.  But none of this justifies the arrogance—or what James 
Jones and Bayless Manning appropriately termed “professional 
hubris”273—involved in arguing that lawyers are the only team 
members who can fully appreciate the importance of candor, 
honesty, loyalty, and the associated need to avoid conflicts of interest.  
These would not be “core values” if they were not comprehended by 
and important to the public generally. 
There are, of course, both scrupulous and unscrupulous 
nonlawyers, just as there are both scrupulous and unscrupulous 
lawyers.  That reality necessitates that a fully integrated MDP be 
organized in a fashion designed to deliver high quality service and 
avoid impropriety by providing potential rewards for proper behavior 
and personally adverse consequences for improper behavior.  The 
final section of this Article suggests a model for a business planning 
MDP, as an example of a firm that can provide clients with a viable 
option for the receipt of multidisciplinary services with safeguards to 
protect fundamental values in the delivery of services to the public. 
IV. A BUSINESS PLANNING MDP PROPOSAL 
A. Identifying an Appropriate Framework 
Since the ABA House of Delegates adopted Resolution 10F in 
July of 2000, much has been written about the need to keep the MDP 
debate alive.  No state has yet, however, implemented rules 
permitting fully integrated MDPs engaged in the delivery of a variety 
 
 273 See supra note 33; see also CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 12 (urging that 
special dual role of lawyers as both service providers to clients and officers of the 
court “does not imply that lawyers are more important or valuable than other 
professionals”); Denckla, supra note 124, at 2594 (arguing that “lawyers have no 
exclusive claim to integrity despite the operation of disciplinary rules which 
ostensibly enforce good behavior”); Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and 
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 
909 (1999) (“Being an ethical lawyer is not much different from being an ethical 
doctor or mail carrier or gas station attendant.”).  But cf. William J. Wertz, The Ethics 
of Large Law Firms—Responses and Reflections, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 182 (2002) 
(challenging Schlitz’s assertion and arguing that “[m]orality for lawyers, especially 
advocates, is, in special ways, deep, complicated and inherently ambiguous”). 
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of legal and other services.  The District of Columbia has retained its 
special version of MRPC 5.4, allowing nonlawyers to own and have 
managerial positions in firms operating in that jurisdiction that 
“[have] as [their] sole purpose providing legal services to clients,”274 
thereby allowing nonlawyers to share in law firm profits in a limited 
context.  New York has modified its Code of Professional 
Responsibility to allow “contract model” MDPs (termed “strategic 
alliances”) within narrow parameters.275  But these New York 
provisions have been criticized as doing little more than officially 
condoning the status quo in terms of limited contractual 
collaborations among lawyers and nonlawyers.276  The District of 
Columbia277 and some states are still studying the MDP issue, though 
many MDP projects have been stalled since the adoption of 
Resolution 10F.278  Among the more notable ongoing initiatives is an 
effort by the California State Bar to promote a “Demonstration 
Project” that would test the concept of a fully integrated (or “pure 
form”) MDP along the lines presented in its Task Force’s 2001 
California MDP Report.279 
Reluctance to permit fully integrated MDPs is depriving the 
public of a valuable option.  As some of the literature has 
appropriately pointed out, it is eminently reasonable to expect that 
the best service providers will seek the respect and profit-sharing 
 
 274 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1996). 
 275 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, pt. 1200 (2002). 
 276 See Powell, Back to the Future, supra note 4, at 1380-84 (sharply criticizing the 
New York provisions as lacking substance in terms of being truly interdisciplinary, 
and as merely codifying limited relationships between lawyers and “subordinate” 
professionals already permitted under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct). 
 277 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is in possession of a 
recommendation approved by the District of Columbia Board of Governors on May 
14, 2002, that would, through amendments to Rules 1.7 and 5.4 of the D.C. Rules of 
Professional Conduct, allow a form of fully integrated MDP owned by lawyers and 
other “professional” service providers, whether controlled by lawyers or nonlawyers, 
but has not yet acted on the recommendation.  Koszewski Memo, supra note 9.  The 
Board of Governors’ conclusion and recommendations, as well as the text of the 
proposed amendments to Rules 1.7 and 5.4, are available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/inside_the_bar/structure/reports/index.cfm. (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2004) [hereinafter “D.C. RECOMMENDATION & RPT.”].  See also Swan, supra 
note 4 (discussing the D.C. Recommendation & Rpt. principally in the context of 
financial planning).  
 278 Koszewski Memo, supra note 9. 
 279 See CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2; see also Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary 
Practice, supra note 7, at 982-84 (recognizing importance and potential of California 
MDP Report, but cautioning that there are both positive and negative factors to 
consider in assessing likelihood of California Bar proposal leading to allowance of 
integrated MDPs). 
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rewards associated with being co-owners.280  The public interest is ill-
served by confining multidisciplinary practice to situations in which 
either the nonlawyers must be employees or otherwise under the 
control of the lawyers, or in which cumbersome contractual 
arrangements segregate the lawyers from the nonlawyers.281  Perhaps 
the need to allow partnering among service providers from different 
disciplines would be more readily apparent if the focus were turned 
away from “mega” law firms and the now Big Four accounting firms.  
Mega-firm Arthur Andersen’s performance on auditing and 
consulting matters for Enron, which was then one of the largest 
companies in the world, simply does not speak to the prospects of 
success of solo and small law, accounting, and consulting firms that 
might merge to form an entity owned and managed by a limited 
number of principals who were all accomplished in their professions 
and possessed sound business judgment. 
This does not mean that separate regulatory frameworks are 
needed for large and small MDPs.  Nor does it mean that the MDP 
Commission was right in proposing in its 1999 Recommendation that 
a special regulatory system is necessary for MDPs controlled by 
nonlawyers as opposed to lawyers.  It is possible to devise one set of 
rules that is loyal to three guiding principles: (1) providing clients 
with the opportunity to receive efficient, high quality, collaborative 
multidisciplinary advice; (2) avoiding conflicts of interest to the same 
extent as with law firms; and (3) utilizing incentives to encourage 
individuals in the MDP to operate in compliance with attorney 
conduct rules, including the implementation of adequate measures 
to protect the “core values” of competence, independent professional 
judgment, and confidentiality.282  The next section will describe in 
 
 280 See, e.g., Powell, Looking Ahead, supra note 19, at 128 (“A rule that prohibits 
lawyers and other professionals from working with clients as equals represents a 
nostalgia that neither we nor our clients can any longer afford.”); Price, supra note 
253, at 1511 (noting that “‘employee’ status is unlikely to attract the most talented 
and valuable professionals to a law firm,” and suggesting that co-owned MDPs would 
have a better chance of attracting such individuals). 
 281 See supra note 4; see also CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 1 (explaining reasons 
for formation of California MDP Task Force by observing that limitations on lawyers 
fee-sharing and acting as “co-principals” with nonlawyers “may have become 
hindrances in delivering effective legal services to the consuming public”). 
 282 Cf. CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at iii (finding that effective maintenance of 
core values can be accomplished “through continued individual accountability of 
lawyers for fulfilling their professional responsibilities in all respects and through a 
required certification process for entities which seek to engage in a ‘pure form’ of 
MDP”); D.C. RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 277, at 3 (concluding that fee-
sharing among lawyers and other professionals would not be against public policy or 
unethical if conditions involving informed disclosure to clients, and lawyers in the 
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some detail how a business planning MDP, as a test case, could be 
allowed to operate under these general parameters.  While it is more 
likely that members of a smaller firm can comply with the proposed 
rules more easily than a mega firm, any sized group that could 
comply with the rules should have the opportunity to do so. 
B. Regulating the Business Planning MDP 
The states’ versions of MRPC 5.4 should be modified to permit 
lawyers to participate in an MDP that provides a mix of legal and 
other services to clients in connection with business planning and 
business transactions, and in which at least one of the owners is a 
licensed attorney (hereinafter a “Business Planning Firm”).  For this 
purpose, “business” could be broadly defined to include any for-profit 
or not-for-profit activity involving the provision of goods or services to 
others, as well as investment activity for a client’s own account or the 
accounts of others.  Particular jurisdictions, however, may want to use 
a more narrow definition on a pilot-project basis.  Subject to the UPL 
rules described below, the Business Planning Firm would be 
permitted to deliver any services reasonably related to the conduct of 
any such business, as well as such ancillary services as litigation or 
advocacy before administrative agencies relating to business matters 
of firm clients, tax return preparation, and estate planning. 
The Business Planning Firm could choose its entity structure 
from the types of business organizations that the applicable state law 
permits for law firms.  There would be no requirement that legal 
services be the primary services delivered by the firm, nor that the 
firm accept only clients seeking legal advice as at least part of the 
services to be obtained from the firm.  Some clients might engage the 
firm solely for what they perceive as legal advice, while others may 
seek accounting services, business consulting, or a combination of 
services.  Due to the interpretational difficulties associated with the 
definition of the unauthorized practice of law and limitations on 
client expertise discussed in the UPL context above,283 a system that 
requires clients of a Business Planning Firm to distinguish between 
“legal” and “nonlegal” services, or to “opt” in or out of attorney–client 
relationships in a formal way,284 would not be a part of the regime 
 
MDP retaining independence and remaining subject to and “effectively held 
responsible for” compliance with their professional conduct rules). 
 283 See supra Part III.A. 
 284 This was suggested, for example, in the California MDP Report for fully 
integrated MDPs.  CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 28.  It should be noted that the 
California MDP Report called for a revisiting of the definition of the “practice of law” 
as well, but did not offer a definition, other than to add a favorable reference to UPL 
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proposed herein. 
The Business Planning Firm and its owners and managers would 
be subject to the following basic restrictions and requirements, and 
on an annual basis each licensed attorney in the firm would have to 
submit to the appropriate regulatory body a certificate designed to 
evidence the level of compliance with these rules. 
1. Permissible Owners 
Under the proposed regulatory structure, the firm would be 
allowed to have as its owners only individuals reasonably expected to 
personally participate in the delivery of permissible legal or other 
services to firm clients.  There would be no set limit on the number 
of such owners in a qualifying firm.  As the Transplex hypothetical in 
Part II above demonstrates, the owners of the Business Planning Firm 
might include such diverse service providers as lawyers, accountants, 
financial planners, insurance advisors, engineers, business and 
marketing consultants, information technology experts, and systems 
analysts.  As the ABA MDP Commission noted in connection with its 
1999 Recommendation, confining ownership in MDPs to just 
“professionals” or “licensed professionals” may be too restrictive and 
begs definitional questions.285  The public should be permitted 
options as to an attractive mix of service providers. 
The MDP Commission’s 2000 Recommendation would have 
limited ownership to “recognized professions or other disciplines that 
are governed by ethical standards.”286 This type of condition would 
add little to the regulatory scheme.  There are societal expectations 
of ethical behavior in business dealings regardless of the extent to 
which ethical standards are published.  Confining participation in 
MDPs to individuals from trades or professions that have formally 
 
provisions that were then under consideration by the State of Washington.  Id. at 39.  
For a pertinent excerpt from the Washington definition, see supra text 
accompanying note 55. 
 285 See ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 52, at 4; ABA 
MDP COMM’N 1999 REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 8; see also CAL. MDP RPT., 
supra note 2, at 25-26 (proposing that MDP participants be confined to licensed 
professionals who have a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility 
compatible with core values of the legal profession); D.C. RECOMMENDATION & RPT., 
supra note 277, at Comments [7] & [8] (explaining that its proposed rule confines 
ownership in MDPs to individuals performing “professional services” without precise 
definition of that term leaving that to common law, but noting that the term “is 
intended to encompass learned callings that require mastery of a recognized field of 
academic knowledge and practice”). 
 286 ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 52, ¶ 1; D.C. 
RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 277, at Comment [7] (similarly explaining that 
its MDP proposal bans passive investment). . 
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memorialized the importance of competence, honesty, and loyalty is 
unnecessary and unduly limiting.  If protection of the perceived “core 
values” of the legal profession is the issue, a better approach would be 
for states to impose a rule that lawyers are not permitted to share fees 
or be co-owners in entities with nonlawyers unless the nonlawyers 
have participated in a program introducing them to the ethical rules 
governing attorneys, perhaps also requiring periodic continuing 
education.  In any event, the lawyers in the Business Planning Firm—
whether owners or employees of the firm—would be bound by all 
applicable attorney conduct rules, several of which are highlighted 
below, and be subject to discipline for engaging in or facilitating 
violation of those rules. 
Consistent with the MDP Commission’s views on the ownership 
of MDPs generally, under the Business Planning Firm model 
envisioned herein, the rules would prohibit “passive equity owners.”287  
Limiting the owners of the Business Planning Firm to include only 
actual service providers circumscribes a group with the common goal 
and responsibility of delivering good service to clients.  If individuals 
or entities who are not delivering services to clients, but to whom the 
managers and service providers within the Business Planning Firm 
would owe fiduciary duties, were permitted to own equity interests in 
the firm, conflicts of interest would routinely arise, similar to the 
conflicts between duties to customers and other constituencies and 
duties to maximize profits for shareholders which have long been the 
subject of controversy in the area of corporate governance.288  
Although prohibiting passive equity investors may limit sources of 
capital for the Business Planning Firm,289 protecting the interests of 
clients through avoidance of conflicting loyalties is an overriding 
consideration.  Suggestions that potential conflicts between the 
fiduciary duties owed to firm clients and those owed to passive 
investors would be assuaged by general conflict avoidance precepts, 
 
 287 Id.; ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RPT., supra note 93, at 3; ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, ¶ 13; see also CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at vi 
(opining that passive investment in MDP or other legal practice should not be 
permitted). 
 288 See generally HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 150, at 643-59. 
 289 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 196-98 (advocating relaxation 
of ban on “passive investment” in order to allow MDPs to have flexible capital 
structure); Fischel, supra note 15, at 968 (similarly advocating permission to raise 
equity capital, but cautioning against potential problems with financing litigation in 
perhaps a more socially undesirable way); Matheson & Adams, supra note 19, at 1301 
(arguing that law firms could operate more efficiently with equity capital, and that 
equity investors could help fund contingency fee case expenses, creating greater 
access to legal services for otherwise underrepresented plaintiffs). 
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and by requiring MDPs to deliver to the lawyers in it “written 
assurances” that “professional judgment will not be impaired,”290 are 
simply unpersuasive. 
2. Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Nonlawyers in the Business Planning Firm would be subject to 
rules similar to those of the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions,291 with some 
modification.  Specifically, nonlawyers would not be allowed to 
represent clients in judicial proceedings or in administrative 
proceedings, unless applicable state law specified to the contrary.  
Nonlawyers could not hold themselves out as lawyers.292  Nor could 
they give legal opinions to non-client third parties—only lawyers in 
the Business Planning Firm would be permitted to do so.  The firm’s 
nonlawyers would be free from UPL prosecution for any other work 
on client matters, even those involving interpretation of laws, so long 
as the firm had among its owners one or more attorneys licensed to 
practice law in each jurisdiction in which the firm does business.  
Outside of the Business Planning Firm (or such other types of MDPs 
in which the jurisdiction permits licensed attorneys to practice), the 
UPL rules applicable to nonlawyers could be more traditional (and 
broad), if the jurisdiction so desires.  Within the MDP, the lawyer 
participants would be charged with supervising and monitoring the 
competence of the persons delivering services that involve 
interpretation of laws. 
The personal exposure aspects of the liability sharing rules 
described in Section 3 below, along with market forces, would 
provide an incentive for the Business Planning Firm’s owners to 
ensure that the firm’s lawyers were sufficiently involved in the giving 
of any advice regarding interpretation of complex laws.  The firm’s 
owners would naturally be inclined to see that law-intensive work was 
done by or under the supervision of lawyers, and that work requiring 
accounting expertise was done by or under the supervision of the 
firm’s accountants, and so on as to the other areas of service.  The 
expectation that the owners and managers of a Business Planning 
Firm would institute systems to provide for interdisciplinary 
communication (and perhaps education through in-house seminars), 
and a sensible division of work is substantiated by the absence of two 
 
 290 See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 197 (describing such an 
alternative). 
 291 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 292 For examples, see clauses (2) and (3) of the 2003 Utah UPL Provisions, supra 
text accompanying note 110. 
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potential problems that might hinder the delivery of competent 
multidisciplinary services in the case of services provided by separate 
firms.  First, lawyers and nonlawyers within the same firm would have 
less of an economic incentive to stretch the limits of their 
competency to avoid losing revenues to another firm in which they 
hold no profit-sharing interest.293  Second, because their reputation 
and economic interests are united in a single organization, the 
lawyers and nonlawyers within the Business Planning Firm would be 
less inclined to ignore suspicions that an individual advising the 
client on certain matters might not be properly handling such 
matters. 
3. Control, Authority, and Liability Sharing 
Under the proposed MDP rules, there would be no requirement 
that lawyers control the Business Planning Firm by percentage 
ownership or otherwise, and no mandate that a separate legal 
department be maintained within the firm.294  A jurisdiction adopting 
the Business Planning Firm model should also take steps to eliminate 
any requirement that accountants be in control of the firm.295  Such 
strict requirements would unnecessarily inhibit a firm’s 
organizational flexibility.  Nonetheless, every lawyer in the MDP 
would be bound by all of the rules of attorney conduct, including 
those requiring the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional 
judgment and maintenance of the confidentiality of client 
information.296  Ethical rules regarding subordinate attorneys would 
remain in place,297 and rules comparable to MRPC Rule 5.1 
(Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervising Lawyers) 
 
 293 Even if a colleague within the firm then did the work, it is likely that the 
individual who brought in the business would, in compensation determinations, 
receive some credit for “originating” the work.  See supra notes 233-34 and 
accompanying text. 
 294 See ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 52, at 2-3 
(recommending some form of control by firm’s lawyers for all fully integrated MDPs 
and suggesting that department structures be implemented in larger firms); see also 
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that fully integrated MDPs 
should have separate legal departments).  Cf. D.C. RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra 
note 277, at Comment [9] (explaining that its MDP proposal does not require 
control by lawyers or segregation of legal units, but suggesting that there might be 
advantages in such areas as “professional oversight” and minimizing privilege or 
other disputes turning on the capacity in which client services are performed). 
 295 See Biamonte, supra note 2, at 1182 (discussing testimony before MDP 
Commission indicating that approximately twenty states had statutes requiring that 
certified public accountants practice in firms owned by at least 51% CPAs). 
 296 See ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, ¶ 5. 
 297 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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and Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) would 
impose obligations on the firm’s lawyers to monitor the conduct of 
other lawyers and nonlawyers to prevent ethics violations.298 
A key element of the proposed framework would be the prospect 
of personal responsibility for malpractice or violations of law.299  A 
state could consider applying special liability sharing rules to MDPs.  
Liability for malpractice with respect to services delivered by the 
firm—whether or not involving interpretations of law—might fall 
jointly and severally on the MDP owners, if such a rule applied to law 
partnerships generally.  Alternatively, a state could impose rules 
similar to those found in some “limited liability partnership” statutes 
whereby a supervisor, lawyer or not, would be personally liable not 
just for the supervisor’s own wrongdoing, but also for actions or 
omissions of individuals under the supervisor’s direction or control, 
regardless of the type of services involved.300  Similarly, each lawyer in 
the Business Planning Firm could be held responsible for violations 
of applicable ethics rules that he knew of, or reasonably should have 
prevented.  Such a system of personal liability (which includes risks of 
economic loss and suspension or revocation of a lawyer’s license to 
practice) should provide significant incentives for lawyers in a 
Business Planning Firm to reach agreement with other owners with 
respect to the establishment and maintenance of a system of checks 
and balances in connection with the delivery of legal opinions and 
other services involving interpretation or application of laws and 
compliance with attorney conduct rules.  It would also encourage 
owners to exercise care in determining with whom they will partner. 
 
 298 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1, R. 5.3 (2004); see also Matheson & 
Adams, supra note 19 (noting the importance of MRPC Rule 5.3 in the MDP context 
in addressing confidentiality concerns).  Cf. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
5.4(b)(3) (1996) (requiring lawyers with financial or managerial interest in 
permitted MDPs to “undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to 
the same extent as if the nonlawyer participants were lawyers under [D.C. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1]”); D.C. RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 277, at 
Comment [6] (citing Rule 5.3 and explaining that under its MDP proposal lawyers 
would be required to take “reasonable measures” to ensure that nonlawyers involved 
do not cause violations of the lawyers’ ethical obligations). 
 299 Cf. ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 52, at 4 
(arguing that incentives to adhere to “control and authority” principle in the MDP 
Commission’s 2000 Recommendation would include possibility of civil liability for 
breaches of duties related to independent judgment, conflicts of interest, 
confidentiality, or standards of practice). 
 300 See generally HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 150, at 60-66 (discussing various 
versions of “limited liability partnership” statutes, including versions that leave a 
partner potentially liable for not only the partner’s own negligence and other 
wrongdoing, but also for negligence and other wrongdoing by individuals under the 
partner’s direct supervision and control). 
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4. Conflicts of Interest 
A lawyer would not be permitted to participate as an owner in 
the Business Planning Firm unless all owners agreed that the firm 
would abide by the conflicts of interest rules, including the 
“imputation” rules that are generally applicable to lawyers and law 
firms.  These rules would be applied, however, with respect to all firm 
clients whether or not they are viewed as receiving legal services.  The 
MDP Commission’s 1999 Recommendation appeared to limit the 
application of the conflicts rules to “the delivery of legal services.”301  
Such a limitation unwisely assumes that a suitable definition of “legal 
services” can be drafted.  The problems associated with drafting and 
applying such a definition would create undue complexity.302  The 
broad application of conflict rules in the fashion herein proposed 
would have substantial positive effects with respect to preserving 
loyalty, and, for those concerned, would discourage the now Big Four 
accounting firms from expropriating the legal profession.303 
5. Audit Services 
Under the proposed model, lawyers would be prohibited from 
owning an interest in a Business Planning Firm that provided audit 
services to any client of the firm, unless audit services were the only 
services the firm provided to such a client.  In addition, lawyers would 
be prohibited from owning an interest in a Business Planning Firm 
that had among its owners anyone who, through a separate firm or 
any other vehicle, provides or receives income from audit services for 
any client who engages the Business Planning Firm for any non-audit 
services.  These prohibitions would apply whether or not the client in 
question was a public company with auditors subject to the auditor 
independence rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.304  The point is that the roles and disclosure obligations 
of auditors (certifying financial disclosures and information about 
the client for the benefit of investors or other third parties) and 
attorneys working (perhaps with other service providers) on 
transactions that may be subject to audit (and zealously representing 
the client’s interests on such transactions), are simply not sufficiently 
aligned to justify permitting in-house audits of clients receiving other 
 
 301 See ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, at 1.  Cf. D.C. 
RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 277, at Conclusion 6 (similarly focusing on 
conflicts where legal services are being provided).  
 302 See ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 4, at 5. 
 303 See Biamonte, supra note 2, at 1184-85. 
 304 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2004). 
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services.305 
One might argue that the prohibitions against audit services 
should apply only if the “other” service the Business Planning Firm 
client is receiving are “legal services.”  However, the problems in 
defining the practice of law would come into play if the “no audit” 
rule were applied to only those clients who receive “legal” services.  
Imposing a complete ban on audits with respect to all Business 
Planning Firm clients who receive any non-audit services may limit, 
but certainly should not eliminate, the universe of accountants 
interested in joining such firms, given the wide range of tax, 
bookkeeping, and other financial services on which accountants have 
expertise.  They may have to forego some audit work under this 
regime, but, at the same time, they will have the opportunity to 
attract other work from clients interested in efficient, 
multidisciplinary service on their business transactions. 
6. Confidentiality and Attorney–Client Privilege 
As noted above, the strength of the public’s interest in the “core 
value” of confidentiality has been questioned by at least some noted 
commentators in recent years.306  High-profile corporate fraud 
scandals may prompt further revisiting of the underpinnings of client 
confidentiality and attorney–client privilege, especially in the context 
of business transactions.  Those prospective ethical considerations 
aside, for the substance over form reasons noted above,307 the lawyers 
in a Business Planning Firm would, in dealing with nonlawyers in the 
firm, be subject to the same confidentiality obligations as apply in 
dealing with nonlawyers generally.  As suggested in the MDP 
Commission’s 1999 Recommendation, the lawyers in the Business 
Planning Firm would be obligated “to make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that [each firm client] sufficiently understands that the lawyer 
and nonlawyer may have different obligations with respect to 
disclosure of client information and that the courts may treat the 
client’s communications to the lawyer and nonlawyer differently.”308  
As with the other rules proposed above, the individual lawyers in the 
 
 305 See, e.g., ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND RPT., supra note 5, at 7 
(characterizing the two roles as “incompatible”).  But cf. Painter, supra note 256 
(suggesting that perhaps disclosure obligations of attorneys should be brought more 
in line with those of auditors). 
 306 See supra notes 255-56. 
 307 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 308 ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, ¶ 9.  Cf. D.C. 
RECOMMENDATION & RPT., supra note 277, at Comment [2] (advocating similar 
disclosure). 
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MDP would be personally responsible for implementing appropriate 
engagement letters, file storage (paper and electronic), and other 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the 
lawyer’s ethical obligations, including obligations with respect to 
confidential information and attorney–client privilege. 
7. Segregation of Client Funds 
A jurisdiction’s rules on the handling of client funds would be 
fully applicable to lawyers in the Business Planning Firm.  This is 
consistent with the approach suggested to the MDP Commission by 
the ABA Commission on IOLTA (“Interest on Lawyer Trust 
Accounts”).309 
8. Advertising, Solicitation, and Fees 
The lawyers in the Business Planning Firm would have to 
institute and abide by rules for the nonlawyers in the firm to comply 
with provisions comparable to Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of the MRPC, 
relating to communications that make representations of services 
offered, advertising, and solicitation.310  In addition, all fees for 
services that only firm lawyers can provide—generally litigation and 
providing opinions to third parties—would have to be reasonable 
under rules comparable to MRPC 1.5,311 with individual jurisdictions 
deciding whether or not to extend Rule 1.5 to fees for all other firm 
services.  As with other burdens placed directly or indirectly on lawyer 
and nonlawyer members of the Business Planning Firm under the 
suggested model described herein, compliance with these rules, 
whether or not some participants might view them as burdensome, 
would be a price to pay for the marketing and profit-sharing benefits 
of the fully integrated MDP format. 
9. Mechanics of Implementing the Framework and 
Monitoring MDPs 
From the legal profession’s perspective, changes to counterparts 
of MRPC 5.4 and other rules of attorney conduct would be 
implemented at the state level.  Unlike the MDP Commission’s 1999 
Recommendation312 and the California Bar’s suggested model,313 
 
 309 ABA MDP COMM’N 2000 UPDATED BACKGROUND RPT., supra note 5, at 5. 
 310 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RR. 7.1-7.3 (2004).  See also Price, supra note 
253, at 1521-22 (advocating such an approach and opining that this approach was 
implicit in the MDP Commission’s recommendations). 
 311 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2004). 
 312 ABA MDP COMM’N 1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 181, ¶ 14.  See also 
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there would not be a court-supervised special certification and audit 
system for the Business Planning Firm as an entity per se.314  Rather, 
individual certifications would be required of lawyers seeking annual 
renewal of their law licenses.  The renewal forms would require 
disclosure of nonlawyers’ ownership interests in the firm, and answers 
to a series of questions designed to uncover non-compliance with the 
basic rules described above.  The regulatory system would thus be 
predicated on the ability to discipline lawyers who commit or permit 
violations of the aforementioned rules. 
Licensing requirements and codes of conduct governing 
accountants and other nonlawyer service providers represented in the 
Business Planning Firm would also have to conform to these rules.  If 
the rules of conduct of a given trade or profession represented in the 
Business Planning Firm permit activity that would violate the revised 
rules of attorney conduct, each lawyer in the firm would be 
responsible and subject to discipline for any such activity that the 
lawyer knew of, or, through reasonable efforts, should have 
prevented.315  The guiding principles of delivering high quality 
interdisciplinary service to clients, avoiding conflicts of interest, and 
taking individual responsibility for complying with legal and ethical 
requirements should be common to all service providers seeking to 
participate in a Business Planning Firm.  Moreover, while this Article 
has argued that permitting Business Planning Firms would be 
beneficial in view of the present difficulties in distinguishing legal 
from other services in the rendering of business planning advice to 
entrepreneurs, the principles and rules suggested herein would be 
adaptable to MDPs aimed at other public needs. 
 
Sydney M. Cone, III, Five Years Later: Reconsidering the Original ABA Report on MDP, 29 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 597 (2004) (arguing that the ABA’s MDP Commission should 
have explored in much more detail a system of entity-level licensing of Maps). 
 313 CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 36-37. 
 314 Malpractice insurance carriers would likely, however, ask entity level questions 
in connection with renewals of coverage, targeted at making sure both the lawyers 
and nonlawyers in the firm were taking appropriate measures to assure competence, 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and compliance with ethical and other obligations.  
This would be a helpful supplement to self-policing by the firm’s owners. 
 315 Cf. CAL. MDP RPT., supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that any resulting limitation on 
business practices of lawyers and nonlawyers in a “pure form” MDP under its model 
of overlapping, cumulative core values would “come as a ‘cost of doing business’ 
together”).  See also Cone, supra note 312, at 612 (suggesting that if conflicting 
licensing rules of regulated professions were involved “resolution in favor of the 
strictest rule would often be both proper and readily applicable”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Modern business planning and business transactions in the 
United States are unavoidably complex and essentially 
multidisciplinary endeavors.  A large and thoughtful body of 
literature strongly supports the notion that allowing fully integrated 
MDPs is a sensible and overdue measure.  The “core values” 
arguments made by MDP opponents, though identifying important 
concerns, are inconsistent and elevate form over substance.  The 
MDP debate in the United States has appropriately continued beyond 
the July 2000 dismissal of the MDP Commission by the ABA House of 
Delegates.  The recent difficulties in creating fair and manageable 
definitions of the practice of law are relevant to the MDP issue, as 
they speak to the blurring of lines between the work of lawyers and 
that of other providers of services to business clients.  The UPL 
experiences, as well as the lessons from Enron and other recent 
major audit failures, suggest the desirability of more integrated 
interaction and mutual understanding, rather than more distance, 
between lawyers and nonlawyers collaborating on projects for 
business clients. 
This Article has presented a model for a Business Planning Firm 
as an example of a fully integrated MDP that can both provide high 
quality interdisciplinary services to entrepreneurs and preserve core 
values traditionally honored by the legal profession.  The model, 
which should be readily adaptable to other types of fully integrated 
MDPs, proposes a system of regulation that has two key themes.  It is 
in part based on confidence in the inherent integrity of most 
individual attorneys and other service providers, and in part on 
incentives, including both potential for personal rewards and risks of 
personal liability, designed to promote self-policing of MDP 
participants as a safeguard against temptations to sacrifice “core 
values.”  While individual jurisdictions no doubt would have to work 
through several details in addition to, or in modification of, some 
aspects of the framework suggested in this Article in order to 
implement such a regulatory regime, it is hoped that jurisdictions will 
find that work worthwhile and in the public interest. 
 
